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Abstract      
 
This thesis is a systematic literature review of performance-based compensation literature of non-
executive managers and employees utilizing the realist review method. The purpose of the thesis is to 
find and describe the variables affecting performance-based compensation. The variables are 
examined within a customized framework of 10 themes, which is based on Bonner and Sprinkle’s 
2002 framework on performance incentives. These 10 themes are the effectiveness of performance-
based compensation, performance measurement, subjective performance measurement, fairness 
perceptions, cultural differences, employee retention and attraction, contract framing, goal setting, 
implementation, and feedback. These themes are then explored in the realist review to explain why, 
how and in what contexts the variables affect performance-based compensation. The literature sample 
extends on Bonner and Sprinkle’s research by including empirical studies in addition to experimental 
studies. Also, the applicability of the realist review method to management accounting research is 
evaluated. 
 
The thesis finds that performance-based compensation increases firm performance, especially if the 
employees perceive the system as fair. Performance measurement needs to be accurate, and targets 
need to be set to follow organizational goals. Subjective performance measurement, manager 
discretion, and peer-reviews can be used to complement objective performance measures. While 
penalties are found to extract more performance, bonuses are generally considered to be the better 
option. Performance-based compensation can be used to attract and retain talent and implementation 
process is important in the success of a performance-based compensation system. The effect of 
feedback is unclear. All the variables of performance-based compensation are subject to cultural 
differences, and it is difficult to define how generalizable the findings from one region, country or 
culture are to another culture. Finally, the realist review method is found to be a potentially effective 
research method for systematic literature reviews in management accounting. 
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People are sometimes willing to put an incredible amount of effort to achieve their 
goals. Professional athletes devote their life for sports, musicians spend countless 
hours practicing their instruments and entrepreneurs live for their firm. Some people 
also have a strong internal motivation to succeed academically and professionally. 
While not everyone has the drive to become a professional athlete, professional 
musician or a high performer at work, everyone is capable of pushing themselves to 
incredible results if they are sufficiently motivated. This thesis is inspired by the 
curiosity to find out if any employees could be motivated to increase their work 
performance with performance-based compensation (PBC). 
There is a strong interest in PBC systems in fast-growing Finnish software firms. 
Retaining good software developers is much less costly than recruiting and training 
new employees – and the pool of good developers who know the specific technologies 
is very limited. PBC can be utilized not only to motivate employees to perform better 
(Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002), but also to retain employees and attract new talented 
employees (Lazear, 2000). However, PBC is a complex tool with many variables and 
interdependencies. Implementing a PBC system without training and experience is a 
difficult undertaking for an entrepreneur and could even cause unintended harm 
instead of benefits (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994). 
1.2 Goals 
This thesis is a systematic literature review of PBC of non-executive managers and 
employees. The thesis utilizes realist review method to look at what works, for what 
reason, how and in what context for 10 variables in performance-based compensation. 
These 10 variables are based on a customized framework of variables in performance-
based compensation. The framework is based on the performance incentive framework 
of Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) and customized with the performance measurement 
frameworks of Franco-Santos, Lucianetti and Bourne (2012), and Ferreira and Otley 
(2009). This thesis’ systematic literature review extends the systematic literature 
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review of Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) on performance-based compensation, as Bonner 
and Sprinkle only study experimental studies while this thesis also includes studies 
that use real-life empirical data. The final framework of 10 variables affecting PBC is 
presented in the following 10 hypotheses. 
H1a: Performance-based compensation is effective in increasing firm 
performance. 
H1b: Performance measurements need to measure and reward the employee on 
the dimensions that reflect the firm strategy. 
H1c: Subjective performance measures are usually an effective complement to 
objective performance measures. 
H1d: The employees’ perception of fairness in their performance-based 
compensation increases firm performance. 
H1e: Performance-based compensation has significant cultural differences in 
North America, Europe, and Asia. 
H1f: Performance-based compensation schemes can be utilized to attract skilled 
employees. 
H1g: Penalties extract better performance than bonuses. 
H1h: The more difficult the targets the better the performance. 
H1i: It is beneficial to involve employees in the planning process of a new 
performance-based compensation system. 
H1j: Performance feedback improves performance. 
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Also, this thesis explores the feasibility of a novel systematic literature review method, 
a “realist review”, in management accounting research. Realist review is traditionally 
used in health sector research to summarize and synthesize findings of empirical 
studies for policymakers to support evidence-based decision-making. The realist 
review method in this thesis aims to summarize the findings from incentive literature 
to form an understanding of some of the complexities affecting PBC. The thesis tests 
if realist review can provide useful information for managerial decision-making in 
management accounting. 
H2: Realist review is an effective systematic literature review method for 
management accounting research. 
The thesis contributes to the pragmatic science base of management accounting by 
systematically assessing PBC literature and explaining the results in a form that 
supports the designing of a PBC system in practice. Drawing a general picture of 
current research findings in the form of a realist review will help entrepreneurs and 
executive managers to design and implement PBC systems. There is a lack of this sort 
of pragmatic science in management accounting, as the findings in research are rarely 
put in a form that is applicable in practice (Jansen, 2018). 
1.3 Research design 
The study is a systematic literature review. The systematic literature review aims to 
locate, appraise the quality, and synthesize the findings from relevant research. The 
key features of a systematic literature review are a transparent and clear pre-specified 
search strategy with inclusion and exclusion criteria, and a specific method of 
processing the included studies. (Torgerson, 2003, p. 2.) 
Systematic literature reviews have multiple possible methods to process the studies. 
This thesis uses the realist review method. Realist review is a qualitative review 
method and belongs in the “test review”-category, which also includes meta-analysis,  
a more common review method. Realist review is a method developed for synthetizing 
research results for policymaking by summarizing information about why something 
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is happening, in which cases does it happen, and what are the variables that affect this 
phenomenon. (Xiao & Watson, 2019.) 
In this thesis, the literature search is limited to top-ranked accounting journals and 
various search terms are used to find PBC literature as comprehensively as possible 
from the selected journals. The studies are then filtered based on titles and abstracts, 
excluding unrelated subjects. Finally, studies are rejected or accepted based on the 
article content or availability of the articles, resulting in a final sample of 82 articles. 
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2 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING AND PERFORMANCE-BASED 
COMPENSATION RESEARCH 
In this chapter, management accounting research is presented with the theoretical 
background on management control, performance management systems and 
performance-based compensation. Then, the theoretical background for dimensions 
that are used in this study are presented: performance measurement, subjective 
performance measures, fairness perceptions, personal and cultural differences, 
employee attraction and retention, contract framing and risk, goals and targets, 
implementation, and feedback. Finally, agency theory is presented. 
2.1 Management accounting research 
2.1.1 Management accounting theory 
Management accounting is fundamentally an applied science, that attempts to provide 
solutions for practical problems in organizations (Jansen, 2018). Common 
management accounting tools and techniques to solve practical problems, like activity-
based costing and balanced scorecard, can be called normative theories (Jansen, 2018). 
The problem is that these normative theories are rarely thoroughly empirically tested, 
and consequently are not considered actual academic theories (Malmi, Teemu & 
Granlund, 2009). Malmi and Granlund (2009) point out that there are, in fact, no 
management accounting theories that have academic theory status. Management 
accounting studies merely borrow theories from other disciplines like economics, 
social sciences, and organization science. One of the most used theory in management 
accounting is agency theory, which is presented in detail later in this chapter. 
The management accounting research can be roughly categorized into two approaches: 
positivist research and interpretative research (Jansen, 2018). Positivism is based on a 
single reality, where anything that can be perceived is real and exists independently of 
human thought and perception (Bisman, 2010; Jansen, 2018). Interpretative research, 
in turn, assumes that subjective experiences construct the social reality, and a single, 
objective reality does not exist (Bisman, 2010; Jansen, 2018). While interpretative 
research is criticized for being invalid and untrustworthy (Lukka & Modell, 2010), 
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positivist research faces critique for being too general and self-evident to be useful in 
practical applications (Jansen, 2018). 
Systematic literature reviews have historically been positivist (Torgerson, 2003, p. 7), 
but as systematic literature review methods have evolved it has become more 
acceptable to also utilize an interpretative approach to systematic reviews (Xiao & 
Watson, 2019). This thesis utilizes a realist review method, which does not directly 
classify under either paradigm. However, realist review has more features from 
interpretative research than positivist research since its function is to address practical 
problems and the method allows interpretation. Realist review is an especially useful 
method in synthetising interpretative intervention studies and case studies (Pawson, 
Greenhalgh, Harvey, & Walshe, 2004), which are common methods of research in 
management accounting. 
2.1.2 Management control 
Kaplan (1984) explains that management accounting has traditionally served two main 
purposes. First, to acquire and report information for internal planning via cost 
accounting, and second, to assist in coordinating, planning and control to improve 
organizational performance with management control. Cost accounting is the 
discipline that measures, analyses, and reports costs and profitability in different parts 
of the business and is not in the scope of this thesis. Management control aims to 
support the firm to implement a strategy and achieve organizational goals by managing 
and controlling the organizational structure, culture, and human capital (Strauss & 
Zecher, 2013). Management control methods try to achieve goal congruence, where 
management and employees’ goals are aligned. In other words, management control 
attempts to guide the employee to do the things that the organization wants them to do 
and tries to prevent them from doing things that the organization does not want them 
to do (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Management control is an umbrella concept that 
includes multiple overlapping disciplines, like performance measurement, 
performance evaluation, strategic planning, budgeting - and of course PBC (Strauss & 
Zecher, 2013). 
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2.2 Performance management frameworks 
Performance management systems, which includes the PBC systems, serve the 
organization’s need for management control. There are several frameworks created to 
study performance management systems, performance measurement and incentives 
from different perspectives. In this study, I use Bonner and Sprinkle’s (2002) 
framework of incentive systems with four main themes to form the basis of the thesis’ 
framework. The four topics are then extended with the frameworks of Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) and Franco-Santos et al. (2012). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) summarize 
that the effects of performance-based compensation are not universally valid, and 
Franco-Santos et al. (2012) mention that also the effects of performance measurement 
suffer from the lack of generalizability. This thesis attempts to explain the mechanisms 
and contexts where certain elements of performance-based compensation work within 
the framework of the variables presented in Table 1. 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework of management control systems and 
performance management systems research includes 12 questions that are matched to 
Bonner and Sprinkle’s (2002) similar topics in Table 1. Franco-Santos et al. (2012) 
framework for contemporary performance measurement systems research has 21 
dimensions that are also matched with similar topics of the other two frameworks. 
Finally, the last column of Table 1 presents this thesis’ framework based on Bonner 
and Sprinkle (2002) and complemented with Ferreira and Otley (2009) and Franco-
Santos et al. (2012). 
Table 1: Frameworks for research in performance management and management control 
Bonner and Sprinkle 
(2002) 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) 
Performance Management 
Systems framework 
Franco-Santos et al. 
(2012) Strategic 
Performance Measurement 





- intrinsic motivation 
- cultural background 
 Leadership and culture 
5. Personal and cultural 
differences 






- task attractiveness 
  
7. Contract framing and 
risk 
6. Target setting  8. Goals and targets 
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Environmental variables: 




- decision rights 
- time pressure 
9. Information flows, 








- rewarded dimension of 
performance 
- level of pay 
- timing 
- scheme type 
8. Financial or non-
financial rewards 
 
1. The effectiveness of 
performance-based 
compensation 
2. Key factors that are 





3. Subjective measures, 
peer-reviews and 
manager discretion 
5. Key performance 
measures deriving from 
firm objectives 
Organization and business 
unit performance 







12. Are the links between 
performance management 
systems and the way they 
are used strong and 
coherent 
Perceptions of 
subjectivity, justice and 
trust 
4. Fairness perceptions 
  Satisfaction 
6. Employee attraction 
and retention  
4. Strategies and plans the 











development and changes 





1. Vision and mission of 
the organization 
  
 3. Organization structure Management practices  
 
10. How information is 
used 
Decision making, learning, 
self-monitoring 
 
  Judgment biases  
  Conflicts and tensions  
  Role understanding  
  Strategic capabilities  
  Corporate control  
Table 1 visualizes that this thesis’ framework adds the perspectives of fairness 
perception, employee attraction and retention, and implementation to the framework 
of Bonner and Sprinkle. Additionally, the framework breaks down some of the Bonner 
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and Sprinkle’s classifications into multiple parts to avoid too broad generalizations 
about PBC in the realist review. 
2.3 Performance-based compensation 
Performance-based compensation refers to extra compensation paid on top of the fixed 
salary for performing well at work. This could be meeting performance targets, getting 
favorable reviews from managers and peers, or getting sales commission. Most 
countries have a minimum fixed salary, defined by law or unions. Nevertheless, firms 
typically pay above minimum salary and reward the employee for good performance 
with PBC, especially if the firm requires highly skilled employees. PBC is a system 
where the employee receives a reward at the end of a pre-defined period based on their 
work performance. In other words, the compensation is dependent on employee 
performance or output, unlike the fixed salary which is paid regardless of performance. 
PBC is widely used to increase employee commitment towards the firm’s goals. It is 
generally agreed that PBC can increase firm performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). 
However, the evidence is mixed regarding the PBC effects on individual performance, 
and sometimes the effect of PBC can even be negative to firm performance (Baker et 
al., 1994; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). The knowledge of which methods are beneficial 
and which ones are harmful in PBC is especially important because of the risk of 
causing significant damage to the firm by implementing a poorly designed PBC system 
(Baker et al., 1994). Some argue that the employee’s intrinsic motivation and 
performance-based compensation are incompatible, presuming that incentives and 
control reduce the performance of a highly motivated employee (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & 
Ford, 2014). Cerasoli et al. (2014) find that not only does PBC work in contexts where 
the employee is motivated, but PBC can sometimes significantly boost performance 
when the employee is highly motivated. 
2.4 Performance measurement 
Traditionally, performance measurement has been based on control. Firms have set 
actions that they wish their employees to complete and then measure and monitor if 
the employees have taken the actions (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The performance-
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based compensation rewards are based on performance measurements and 
performance targets. In other words, an employee has a certain work output that is 
measured and compared with pre-defined output target levels that then reward the 
employee for achieving or exceeding the desired output levels with performance-based 
compensation. In some systems, failing to meet the desired output might also result in 
a penalty for the employee. 
The simplest performance based-compensation system is the piecework, or a piece-
rate system. Piece-rates refer to performance-based pay that is rewarded based on how 
many units the employee has produced, for example in a manufacturing facility. 
However, basing the measurement on units produced is only possible if the employee 
output is cheap and objective to measure. Piece-rates are much less effective when the 
work is complex and the output is difficult to measure, for example in managerial and 
professional roles. (Lazear, 2000.) 
To bring more elements to performance measurement, Kaplan and Norton developed 
the balanced scorecard, which is nowadays the most well-known method for 
performance measurement that combines financial and operational performance 
measures. The balanced scorecard attempts to widen the perspective of performance 
measurement to not only focus on controlling the employee’s performance on one 
dimension, but to allow the employee to find the best ways to meet the performance 
targets by measuring multiple dimensions and rewarding for overall good 
performance. These dimensions are financial perspective, customer perspective, 
internal business perspective, and innovation and learning perspective. (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992). 
These balanced scorecard dimensions consist of objective measures, albeit much more 
complex than the simple unit output-based piece-rate system. Financial perspective 
consists of external and internal accounting figures and performance reports. Customer 
perspective measures operational variables like lead time, number of defects, number 
of complaints, and delivery forecast accuracy. Internal business perspective monitors 
productivity by measuring cycle time, quality, productivity, and cost. Innovation and 
learning perspective could include the rate of introducing new products, upgrades to 
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old products, or the rate of increasing the performance on other metrics. (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992.) 
2.5 Subjective performance measures and discretion 
Performance measurement in complex organizations usually includes more than only 
one dimension of measurement. Objective performance measures are sometimes 
complemented with subjective performance measures based on manager review, peer-
review, nonfinancial measures or HR measures. Rewarding for performance only on 
objective metrics risks that the employees only focus on those tasks ignoring value-
enhancing tasks that cannot be objectively measured like training and helping others, 
customer satisfaction and marketing (Baker et al., 1994). Subjective performance 
measurements could include flexibility in the weighting of objective performance 
measures, making discretionary target adjustments ex-post, and subjective 
performance evaluation by a manager or the employee’s peers (Voußem, Kramer, & 
Schäffer, 2016). 
The ability for supervisors to use discretion in performance evaluations can reward 
employees on their effort on dimensions of the job that do not directly affect the output 
or affect output that is difficult or impossible to objectively measure (Voußem et al., 
2016). These dimensions could be for example leadership quality, personal integrity, 
professional attitude, supporting colleagues or teamwork. Additionally, the subjective 
performance measurements could discourage employees to attempt gaming objective 
measures, for example attempting to increase profits short-term at the cost of long-
term performance (Baker et al., 1994). However, the risk in subjective performance 
measures is the human factor. Evaluation based on a single supervisor’s review is 
subject to multiple biases like halo effect, favorability bias and availability heuristic 
(Baker et al., 1994; Voußem et al., 2016). Some of the biases and risk of gaming can 
be alleviated with delegating the performance review responsibility to multiple 
managers or utilizing peer-reviews (Baker et al., 1994). 
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2.6 Fairness perceptions 
The perception of justice in the organization, which in this thesis is called the 
perception of fairness, is a substantial basis of performance-based compensation 
research. If an employee feels like they are treated fairly and enjoy their job, they tend 
to outperform those who don’t (Cerasoli et al., 2014; Moorman, 1991). The perceived 
fairness is distributed into three separate categories: distributive, procedural, and 
interactional fairness. In this thesis, these are not distinguished from each other but 
treated as the perception of fairness altogether. This is an intentional simplification for 
the sake of keeping the information concise and readable. 
The two main categories, distributive and procedural fairness are the most common 
and also explain the dimensions of perception of fairness. Distributive fairness is 
simply how fair the distribution of outcome is perceived. In this case, how fair does 
the employee perceives the received bonus. Procedural fairness is how fair the 
organizational practices and processes are perceived. In other words, does the 
employee think that the way bonus payments are determined is fair. (Cohen-Charash 
& Spector, 2001.) 
Most importantly the perception of fairness predicts employee behavior. Perceived 
unfairness causes negative emotions in the employee and hinders organizational 
performance. Perceived fairness, in turn, predicts organizational commitment, better 
organizational citizenship behavior, trust, and work satisfaction, all of which 
ultimately result in better organizational performance. (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001.) 
2.7 Personal and cultural differences 
Culture affects the perception of performance-based compensation, performance 
measures and contract framing. Even the determinants of what good performance is 
made of are dependent on culture. In individualistic cultures the emphasis is on work 
outcome and results, while in collectivist cultures the in-group loyalty and harmony 
are valued over individual performance (Aycan, 2005). Culture significantly affects 
the effectiveness of PBC and whether bonus contracts outperform penalty contracts 
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(Lee, Ribbink, & Eckerd, 2018). Also, Aycan (2005) mentions that the practice to use 
peer- or self-evaluation in performance measurement only works in cultures with low 
power distance, as in high power distance cultures such utilization of subordinates’ 
feedback is seen to undermine supervisor’s authority. In other words, there are multiple 
mechanisms that are triggered by cultural differences. 
2.8 Employee attraction and retention 
To attract and retain employees, workplace perks like espresso machines and ping-
pong tables in software start-ups are only a stereotype, and employees report a healthy 
work environment and fair compensation as the most important motivational factors 
(Shellenbarger, 2018). Lazear (2000) estimates that half of the productivity increase 
caused by PBC is caused by the ability to hire the most productive employees and 
reduction in quits among high-performing employees. While Lazear’s study utilized 
piece-rates in a manufacturing setting, it is likely that an attractive PBC contract can 
support firms’ recruiting efforts also in fields that require highly educated employees. 
2.9 Contract framing and risk 
The question whether a bonus contract or a penalty contract is more effective is central 
to the PBC. Hannan, Hoffman and Moser (2005) find that while bonuses are 
considered a fairer contract frame, penalties result in better performance. Hannan et al. 
(2005) explain that the better performance under penalty contract frame is caused by 
the strong tendency for loss aversion compared to the motivational effect of bonus 
contract frame.  Nonetheless, if given the choice, employees tend to select bonus 
contracts over penalty contracts due to the same loss aversion effect (Hannan et al., 
2005). Hannan et al. (2005) find that the cost of reduced perception of fairness is 
significant, yet not substantial enough to warrant the choice of penalty contract when 
compared with equal setting on a bonus contract. Lee et al. (2018) note that in some 
cultures bonus and penalty contracts extract the same amount of effort but in other 
cultures bonus contracts are significantly more effective. 
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2.10 Goals and targets 
Generally, people pursue personal goals, and their actions are driven by individual 
desires and motivations. The aim of performance management, management control 
and performance-based incentive plans is to try to motivate the employee towards 
personal goals that are aligned with the firm’s goals (Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 
2013). Central theories to goal setting and its relationship with performance-based 
compensation are the goal congruence theory and the goal-setting theory. 
2.10.1 Goal congruence 
The firm wishes to ensure that the organizational goals are achieved. An effective way 
to ensure that the organizational goals are achieved is to align these organizational 
goals with the employee’s personal agenda at work. This is called goal congruence. In 
management accounting, management control systems’ main purpose is to achieve 
goal congruence (Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013). At the core of achieving goal 
congruence by management controls lies the PBC. The effectiveness was proven 
already in manufacturing firms of the early 1900s utilizing piece-rate salaries in the 
wake of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management theory that was released in 1909 
(Taylor, 2004). Since then, work has become much more complex, and achieving goal 
congruence is usually not as simple as paying extra salary based on the units produced. 
2.10.2 Goal-setting theory 
Setting the right difficulty for the targets is nearly as important as setting the right 
targets that reflect the firm strategy and drive the firm performance. If the targets are 
too easy, the employees do not need to increase their performance to meet them. If the 
targets are too difficult and only a few employees can achieve them, the motivational 
effect of PBC could even be negative. Goal-setting theory summarizes that more 
difficult targets drive performance (Locke & Latham, 2006). 
Locke and Latham explain that difficult targets lead to greater efforts and direct 
attention to the targets instead of nonrelevant actions that do not further the 
achievement of the target. The requirements for higher performance via difficult 
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targets require that the employee has the commitment and ability to achieve the target 
and that they do not have conflicting goals. Especially the achievement of targets is 
deemed important, as employees feel success when they can achieve difficult targets 
that are important and meaningful. (Locke & Latham, 2006.) 
2.11 Implementation 
There are positives in involving the employees in the planning process of the 
performance-based incentive system (Kauhanen & Piekkola, 2006; Moilanen & 
Ikäheimo, 2019). The more complex the work is, the more beneficial it is to include 
the employees during the planning (Kauhanen & Piekkola, 2006). By including 
employees in the planning process, it also enhances the perception of fairness of the 
performance-based incentive system, which is especially important if the PBC is 
utilizing team-based incentives and performance measures (Moilanen & Ikäheimo, 
2019). 
Regarding the planning process, there is evidence that managers generally do not 
consider employees’ perception of the incentive system when designing the system, 
causing the feeling of uncontrollability, which in turn results in explaining missed 
targets by external factors and potentially hampering the effectiveness of the incentive 
system (Moilanen & Ikäheimo, 2019). The implementation process is also important 
especially in terms of how the incentive system is perceived. Even if the system itself 
is deemed fair but it is implemented poorly or insensitively the positive effect is 
reduced or removed by creating a perception of unfairness. (Moilanen & Ikäheimo, 
2019) 
Completing the implementation of the PBC system is not the end, but the development 
of the system continues through its life cycle. Especially when considering the fairness 
perception-point of view, a rigid system very easily creates situations that are 
perceived as unfair, and the system needs to be developed according to the changing 
needs of the organization, team and the business to keep the system goal congruent 
and perceived as fair (Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013). 
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2.12 Feedback, recognition and promotion incentives 
Feedback is information that is provided to the employee regarding their performance. 
The effect of the feedback varies depending on the content, quality and frequency of 
the feedback, task characteristics and situational factors. Feedback, especially negative 
feedback, is considered difficult to give or receive which is exacerbated with cultural 
factors like high power distance and collectivistic culture (Aycan, 2005). In such 
cultural contexts, some studies conclude that feedback is unwelcome (Aycan, 2005). 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) find that feedback generally increases performance and can 
potentially be significantly large and positive driver of performance. Nonetheless, in 
some cases the feedback does not affect performance and in significant number of 
cases the feedback reduces performance (Aycan, 2005; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) conclude that one of the major benefits of giving feedback 
is that feedback changes the direction of attention and is especially effective on lower 
hierarchy levels. They do not find conclusive evidence if giving and receiving positive 
or negative feedback has any difference on the effect on performance. 
2.13 Agency theory 
Agency theory is one of the most used theories in management accounting and a 
fundamental basis for performance-based compensation research. Agent-principal 
relationships prevail in situations where PBC is relevant. That is why, even though 
agency theory is not a management accounting theory per se, the theory is widely used 
in PBC literature. Agency theory was established in the early 1970s, with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) publishing the leading article. Agency theory is the most used theory 
in this thesis’ literature sample, being explicitly mentioned in 17 out of the 82 articles. 
Agency theory also introduces multiple other theories that build the foundation for 
most of the PBC literature, like the theories and norms of self-interest, moral hazard, 
risk aversion, bounded rationality, and information asymmetry. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agent-principal relationship as a service, which 
is desired by the principal but performed by the agent. The agency problem is that the 
agent, driven by their own utility-maximizing motive, in other words, self-interest, 
might not always act in the best interest of the principal because usually the principal 
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and the agent have different motives. Eisenhardt (1989) summarizes the agency 
problem into two parts. To begin with, the goals of the principal and the agent are 
different, and the principal cannot monitor the agent to do as desired. Then, the 
principal and agent have a different attitude toward risk, and consequently prefer 
different courses of action. 
A key feature in agency theory is the information, and how information can alleviate 
the agency problem. The stronger the ability to monitor the employees’ actions and 
acquire information about them, the less severe the agency problem becomes. 
Additionally, using incentives like PBC to line up the goals of the principal and the 
agent, to achieve goal congruence, is another way to the battle agency problem if 
acquiring information is impossible or too costly. (Eisenhardt, 1989.) 
In addition to the assumption of information asymmetry between the agent and the 
principal, agency theory relies on few other assumptions and base theories. These are 
assumptions that a human is driven by self-interest, has bounded rationality, and is 
risk averse. However, risk aversion has a counter-effect of moral hazard, and 
information asymmetry causes adverse selection. All these assumptions and base 
theories, which are further explained in the next sections, result in goal conflict and 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent and are the root of the agency 
problem. (Eisenhardt, 1989.) 
2.13.1 Self-interested and individual agent 
The agent is assumed to attempt the maximization of their own utility. The utility can 
be defined in different methods; a well-known one is Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. 
Fundamentally, the hierarchy of needs is built on tiers that represent the urgency of the 
need. The first level is physiological needs, which refers to a need to, for example, eat, 
drink and sleep. The second level is safety, which refers to practically living in freedom 
from fear and being protected physically. The third level is the need for love and 
belongingness, after which the fourth level is esteem needs like dignity and 
achievement. The last level is self-actualization which refers to self-fulfillment and 
personal growth. (McLeod, 2007.) 
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The important takeaway from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is that a self-interested 
agent is not necessarily selfish. While Taylor’s scientific management assumed that 
agents are only driven by money, the truth is much more complex, and the agents 
maximize their utility in varying ways. 
The personal variance between individuals is what makes the agent-principal 
relationship difficult. If everyone were robots, the goal congruence would be 
guaranteed and there would be no information asymmetry between agents and the 
principals. Since information asymmetry always exists, the decisions and goals of the 
agent are not naturally in line with the principal. Even if all the information was 
available, the agent is still unlikely to make optimal decisions due to moral hazard. 
2.13.2 Moral hazard and risk aversion 
Moral hazard refers to a situation, where the agent and principal bear a different 
amount of responsibility for risk. The agent might make a decision with negative 
consequences, that do not land on the agent themselves. Moral hazard can be alleviated 
by information systems, since acquiring information about an agent’s action and state 
of nature is helpful even if imperfect (Holmström, 1979). Unfortunately, even if there 
was no information asymmetry and no moral hazard, the agent might still make the 
harmful decision due to bounded rationality or the difference in risk aversion of the 
agent and the principal. 
In agency theory, it is assumed that the agent is risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989). For 
example, in a case of an important investment decision, the agent might not choose the 
best action because the agent deems it too risky. Risk aversion also significantly differs 
between individuals. An organization can combat this with incentives; the employees 
can be motivated to be more risk-averse (Brink & Rankin, 2013; Hirsch, Reichert, & 
Sohn, 2017; Liang, Rajan, & Ray, 2008) or to take more risks (Hannan, Krishnan, & 
Newman, 2008; Hirsch et al., 2017; Oblak, Ličen, & Slapničar, 2018) depending on 
the methods utilized. 
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2.13.3 Bounded rationality and information asymmetry 
Assuming all the information and all the choices with every possible outcome are 
available for the agent for a cost, the question is “how much can be invested into 
making the decision?”. Human information processing capacity is limited, and nearly 
always there are too many complexities and too great constraints for the agent to 
consider all the possible scenarios to choose the optimal one. This leads to the theory 
of bounded rationality, where decisions are always clouded in a certain amount of 
uncertainty and are up to the individual interpretation of situations even if all the 
information was possible to be acquired. (Simon, 1972.) 
In practice, all the information is usually not available for decision-making. Sometimes 
the situation completely changes after the first decision has been made, making it 
impossible to predict what are all the possible outcomes. Additionally, information 
and communication between the principal and agent may be imperfect, where the agent 
misunderstands the goals of the principal when making the investment decision. At 
worst, there might be a situation where the agent or the principal knowingly withholds 
information from the other party to benefit themselves. This is called adverse selection. 
(Eisenhardt, 1989.) 
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3 SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Systematic Review as a method 
A literature review is one of the essential features of academic research. New 
knowledge needs to be built on existing knowledge – and the main goal of a literature 
review is to summarize and categorize existing knowledge (Fisch & Block, 2018). 
With a systematic review, the existing literature can be structured in different ways 
depending on the literature review method, enhancing the overall understanding of the 
existing knowledge. (Xiao & Watson, 2019). A systematic review aims to explore the 
body of existing literature in a precisely structured and systematic way, defining the 
frontier of current research (Xiao & Watson, 2019). While the basis of the systematic 
literature review lies in the structured and rigorously documented research approach, 
the synthetizing of results also requires author interpretation, incorporating a level of 
subjectivity in the method (Fisch & Block, 2018). Nonetheless, the differentiating 
factor of the systematic literature review from other literature review methods like 
narrative literature review is the systematic nature of the search strategy and inclusion 
criteria. The reproducibility and well-defined structure of the literature search is 
important in a systematic literature review, differentiating it from the other literature 
review methods (Torgerson, 2003, p. 5). 
The systematic literature review begins with setting the scope of the review by defining 
the inclusion criteria of the study. This builds the foundation for the literature search, 
which needs to be conducted systematically and documented carefully, including 
search terms and search tools. Then the found literature is screened and usually filtered 
based on the articles’ abstract, choosing the relevant studies that fit the pre-defined 
inclusion criteria. The quality and eligibility are also assessed at this stage, filtering 
the articles based on, for example, publication or content quality after skimming the 
article. After these steps, the data can be extracted, interpreted, and presented. (Xiao 
& Watson, 2019.) 
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3.2 Systematic Literature Review in general 
Healthcare, social science, and educational science were the early adopters of 
systematic review (Torgerson, 2003, p. 6). The first notable paper explicitly containing 
systematic review goes back to the 1904 study of typhoid vaccine, even though some 
varieties of meta-synthesis have been utilized earlier in, for example, astronomy and 
psychology (Chalmers, Hedges, & Cooper, 2002). In the mid-1900s meta-analyses 
were already used in social sciences, education, and agriculture (Chalmers et al., 2002; 
Torgerson, 2003, p. 9). For a long time, systematic reviews were not regarded as novel 
pieces of research but considered as parasitic attempts to recycle already researched 
knowledge (Chalmers et al., 2002). 
In the early 1990s, the health care sector identified a need for a comprehensive 
knowledge base, as a single study rarely manages to touch all possible dimensions 
since most studies are constrained by time, set in a certain context, and have a 
specifically limited sample which all introduce limitations to overall applicability of 
the results (Torgerson, 2003, p. 4). In healthcare, this stronger emergence of systematic 
reviews was led by Cochrane Collaboration not only conducting systematic reviews in 
health care, but also creating guidelines in how to write systematic reviews, beginning 
their work as early as in the 1970s (Chalmers et al., 2002; Pawson et al., 2004). This 
has led to the increasing use of systematic reviews to find the totality of research results 
to be able to utilize the already existing knowledge more comprehensively in decision-
making (Torgerson, 2003, p. 5). 
Logically, healthcare was, and still is, the forerunner in the rise of systematic review. 
Systematically synthetizing knowledge from studies has the potential to discover both 
universal effects and universal ineffectiveness. In the 1990s, the increased number of 
systematic reviews increased the available knowledge for decision-makers in 
healthcare, helping make better-informed decisions regarding the treatment procedures 
of patients and consequently boosting the perception of systematic reviews. As a result, 
in the 1990s multiple official instances, like the health officials in Denmark, Britain, 
and the Netherlands, started to require conducting a systematic review as a 
precondition before granting funding for new healthcare research. (Chalmers et al., 
2002.) 
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Nowadays, the practice of requiring a systematic review before acquiring funding for 
a research project is not at all uncommon in all disciplines. In addition, systematic 
reviews are not only standalone pieces but are commonly used to complement and 
form a background for any research (Xiao & Watson, 2019). Chalmers et al. (2002) 
note that science by nature is cumulative, but that the responsibility to cumulate the 
knowledge lies in the scientists. Without systematically gathering the knowledge, the 
findings of research remain scattered. 
Figure 1: Scopus results with search terms “systematic literature review”, “systematic review” or 
“meta-analysis” by publishing year (1990-2021) until June 2021 
 
In Figure 1, a Scopus search with the terms “systematic literature review” or 
“systematic review” or “meta-analysis” is visualized. Before the year 1990, less than 
50 systematic literature reviews have been published annually while nowadays the 
quantity of systematic literature reviews published annually is a five-figure number. 
Even when removing the term “meta-analysis” from the search, the numbers do not 
change significantly. The result indicates a significant improvement in the perception 
of systematic literature review and supports Chalmers et al. (2002) statement that 










Table 2: Systematic literature review articles containing certain subjects from 1900-2009 to 2010-
2021 until June 2021 
Subject area 1900-2009 % of total 2010-2021 % of total Change 
Computer Science 263 1.3 % 8204 5.8 % 4.5 % 
Engineering 390 1.9 % 6791 4.8 % 2.9 % 
Social Sciences 1081 5.1 % 11330 8.0 % 2.8 % 
Business, Management and 
Accounting 
299 1.4 % 5911 4.2 % 2.7 % 
Environmental Science 276 1.3 % 5716 4.0 % 2.7 % 
Biochemistry, Genetics and 
Molecular Biology 
1317 6.3 % 12377 8.7 % 2.5 % 
Agricultural and Biological 
Sciences 
318 1.5 % 4927 3.5 % 2.0 % 
Neuroscience 712 3.4 % 6133 4.3 % 0.9 % 
Immunology and Microbiology 381 1.8 % 3582 2.5 % 0.7 % 
Psychology 954 4.5 % 7060 5.0 % 0.4 % 
Pharmacology, Toxicology and 
Pharmaceutics 
758 3.6 % 5551 3.9 % 0.3 % 
Dentistry 503 2.4 % 3368 2.4 % 0.0 % 
Nursing 1482 7.1 % 9274 6.5 % -0.5 % 
Health Professions 1017 4.8 % 5809 4.1 % -0.7 % 
Medicine 17192 81.9 % 99915 70.5 % -11.4 % 
Total articles 20991  141755   
In addition, Table 1 demonstrates the change in the subject area focus on systematic 
literature reviews. The rise in the number of systematic literature reviews can be 
partially attributed to more disciplines starting to use the method. Most of the 
systematic literature reviews conducted nowadays are still from the subjects of 
medicine, biochemistry, and social sciences. 
3.3 Systematic Literature Review in accounting 
In accounting, the usage of systematic reviews has significantly increased very 
recently. By searching in Scopus “Business, Management and Accounting” and 
“Economics, Econometrics, and Finance” categories for keywords “systematic 
literature review” and “accounting”, most results out of the total 142 are from the last 
five years as is visualized in Figure 2. Even when extending the search terms with 
“systematic review” and “meta-analysis” only one more article is found, resulting in 
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no significant difference. The articles in this search are analyzed based on the title and 
keywords, and abstract. 
Based on the search results presented in Figure 2, the use of systematic literature 
reviews has only very recently emerged in the field of accounting as seems to be the 
case for many other disciplines as well. Remarkably, the most common keywords are 
“management accounting” (27/142) and “sustainable development” (14/142), 
followed by “accounting” (11/142) and “management control” (11/142). This 
indicates that conducting a systematic literature review is much more common in 
management accounting research than in financial accounting research. From this 
search, however, none of the systematic literature reviews study PBC.  
Figure 2: Scopus results with search terms “systematic literature review”, “systematic review” or 
“meta-analysis” and “accounting” by publishing year (1992-2021) until June 2021 
 
To find out if other disciplines than accounting have conducted systematic literature 
reviews about PBC, the search terms are changed to include “systematic literature 
review” with “compensation” or “pay” instead of the search term “accounting”. A total 
of six out of the found 104 articles were related to PBC. Only two articles were about 
CEO or executive compensation while four were about non-executive compensation, 









than CEO and executive compensation. None of the systematic literature reviews 
related to PBC or executive compensation were published in an accounting journal. 
The six articles were published in health economics journals, human resources 
journals, and management journals, indicating that there is a research opportunity in 
systematically reviewing literature about PBC from a management accounting 
perspective.  
Overall, there are not many systematic literature reviews conducted in accounting in 
general, and especially PBC has very few published systematic literature reviews. It is 
difficult to speculate why the systematic literature reviews have risen to prominence 
only during the last 10 years in accounting, even though systematic literature reviews, 
in general, have started to gain traction already in the 1990s. One of the explanations 
could be that systematic literature reviews might not have been an acceptable form of 
research in accounting until very recently. Also, since literature reviews have not been 
regarded as proper research until recently, less people have likely attempted to create 
literature review articles. Another possibility is that the source literature in specific 
topics in accounting has been so scarce, that a systematic literature review would have 
not been reasonable to conduct. Additionally, there is a possibility that the Scopus 
search did not find all published systematic literature reviews in accounting. 
3.4 Realist Review 
3.4.1 Realism 
Realism is one of the perspectives in modern philosophy and social science. Pawson 
and Tilley (1997, p. 10) define the basic realist formula as: 
𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
Ontologically, scientific realism has a single reality, which considers structures and 
mechanisms as a reality that endures and operates independently of human 
intervention (Kazi & Spurling, 2000). Realism does not consider the reality fully 
observable, but a construct of social processes and human actions, rooted in social 
rules and institutions (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). In this sense, realism lies in the middle 
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ground between pragmatism and positivism. Realist evaluation attempts to make sense 
of the reality as a whole, asking questions like why a program works, for whom, and 
in what circumstances (Kazi & Spurling, 2000). In other words, realist evaluation tries 
to not only figure out the cause and the outcome, but also the context where such 
causality is happening. 
In this middle ground between pragmatism and positivism, realism answers to the 
critique of both. Positivist research has often been criticized for artificially created 
experiments that do not reflect practice. Pragmatism, in turn, has been criticized 
because the reality is reduced to observations – which is also a too narrow view for 
practical purposes. One cannot possibly observe all perspectives of reality, but neither 
can reality be constrained to artificial experimental conditions. Realism attempts to 
partially solve these scientific problems by considering cognitive, social, and physical 
entities as interactive mechanisms. Realist evaluation attempts to identify and 
understand the nature of these mechanisms that are not possible to directly observe. 
(Armstrong, 2019.) 
3.4.2 Test review methods 
Testing reviews aim to test a specific hypothesis or to answer a question about the 
literature. The testing review category includes one of the major systematic literature 
review methods, the meta-analysis. The main difference between realist review and 
meta-analysis is that meta-analysis is a quantitative testing review, that involves 
statistical analysis to test the hypotheses while realist review is a qualitative testing 
review that looks at results in various contexts to find generalizability. The meta-
analysis also relies on standardized data extraction methods, while realist review 
allows for flexible data extraction. (Xiao & Watson, 2019.) 
Realist review’s strength against meta-analysis is the ability to look at the research 
findings more in-depth to find out the environmental, situational, and 
implementational factors that might affect the mechanisms and connections between 
cause and effect. Naturally, the weakness of the realist review is the lack of statistical 
prowess, and that the execution of the review relies more on the author’s interpretation 
of the studies risking potential bias. Meta-analysis excels, in turn, in estimating 
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construct-level correlations and determining sources of variance between different 
research findings and is also able to quantify the variances and separate the sources of 
variance (Derfuss, 2009). 
3.4.3 Realist review method 
Realist review, a literature review with realist ontology, seeks to explain how complex 
programs work or why they fail in certain contexts and settings by gathering a 
comprehensive package of literature to synthesize (Pawson et al., 2004). Pawson et al. 
(2004) present an example of a simple realist review analysis: 
“[R]esearchers would not claim that repeated observations of the application of 
a spark (X) to gunpowder and the subsequent explosions (Y) was a sufficient 
base on which to understand the causal relationship. Rather the connection (O) 
is established by what they know about the chemical composition of 
gunpowder and its instability when heat is applied (M). They also know that 
this mechanism is not always fired and that the explosion depends on other 
contextual features (C) such as the presence of oxygen and the absence of 
dampness.” (Pawson et al., 2004.) 
Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 26) point out that the issue is rarely a simple as “does this 
work?”, but the cause-effect relationships are multi-faceted and depend on the 
participants. The realist review attempts to thoroughly explain the cause-and-effect 
relationships by using the connection (O), underlying mechanisms (M), and 
contiguous contexts (C). (Pawson et al., 2004.) 
In realist review, the mechanism (M) is not the service itself but the response to a 
stimulus – the method of how the context turns into the outcome (Dalkin, Greenhalgh, 
Jones, Cunningham, & Lhussier, 2015). It can also be the trigger to turn the context 
into the outcome via another mechanism (Dalkin et al., 2015). For example, kids’ 
breakfast club before school can explain the increased classroom attentiveness by 
offering the kids a nutritious start to the day (M) or working as an energy diffuser 
before actual class (M). It could also feature negative effects via mechanisms like 
serving as an opportunity to plan misdeeds for the day (M) or be a catalyst to too 
chaotic energy that carries on to the classroom (M). 
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It is self-evident that the context (C) has a significant effect on the cause-and-effect 
relationship. In performance-based compensation, the cultural factor is one of the 
major variables that affects both the size and the effectiveness of the bonuses. In 
addition, the individual traits are likely to have an effect on the mechanisms and 
outcome how performance-based compensation works. The mechanics activated in 
certain contexts yield outcome-patterns (O). These are the intended and unintended 
results of triggering different mechanisms in different contexts (Pawson & Tilley, 
1997, p. 66).  
Pawson et al. (2004) argue that on the contrary to traditional pragmatism, realist review 
avoids “exemplary cases” claiming that the same intervention never gets implemented 
identically, and even if it did, the success gained in one context might not be 
transferable to a different social and institutional environment. Realist review focuses 
especially on answering the question “What works for whom in what circumstances, 
in what respects and how?” (Pawson et al., 2004). 
Realist review is a relatively recent method in systematic literature reviews, introduced 
originally by Pawson and Tilley (1997). More prominently used in health studies, the 
method has not become very widespread with only 402 articles containing the two 
adjacent words “realist review” in their title when searching from Scopus. This is less 
than 0.3% of total systematic literature reviews found in Scopus. In accounting, the 
utilization of realist review or realist evaluation methods could not be found in 
published articles. In business and organizational studies, the findings are scarce, but 
some studies have been published. 
3.4.4 Purpose of using realist review method 
Realist review was developed to support policymaking in the health sector by 
evaluating framework integrity, reviewing rival frameworks, reviewing the same 
framework in different settings, or reviewing expectations versus practice (Pawson, 
Greenhalgh, Harvey, & Walshe, 2005). In a more general sense, the strength of realist 
review as a method is in the freedom given to the reviewer to adopt a flexible approach 
to evidence gathering and collection (Armstrong, 2019). Realist review does not 
attempt to debunk theories or reject causalities, but rather find out the underlying 
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“why” behind the causalities (Armstrong, 2019). For PBC literature, the aim to find 
the underlying mechanisms is especially powerful, since PBC studies are often 
contradictory in their findings and there are few to none universally proven causalities 
that would be effective in all situations and environments. 
3.5 Criticism 
The systematic literature review method is not without its weaknesses. It has been 
deemed too mechanical, without enough regard for the quality and interpretation 
(Torgerson, 2003, p. 11). This concern is manageable due to the wide variety of 
systematic review techniques available, and in some of them, there is room for 
interpretation. Especially the realist review method relies heavily on author 
interpretation (Xiao & Watson, 2019). The more room for interpretation, of course, the 
more suspect the study is to bias. Still, not only is the author’s subject to bias in 
interpretation a valid point of criticism, but also the bias in the selection of the literature 
(Torgerson, 2003, p. 12). Torgerson (2003) explains that there is a risk of choosing 
research results that are of poor quality or irrelevant altogether, which would influence 
the final synthesis (p. 12). In addition, there is a possibility of negative or null results 
that have not been published at all due to them being uninteresting or unoriginal for 
the journal editors (Torgerson, 2003, p. 64). Ultimately, a systematic literature review 
is subject to the author’s values and interpretation, highlighting the importance to 
acknowledge these biases during the systematic literature review process (Torgerson, 
2003, p. 12). 
For realist review, the analysis of complex systems poses limitations for the reviewer 
especially. The reviewer has a limit on how much of the content can be covered, so 
the review question needs to be carefully determined. Additionally, the reviewer needs 
to not only be careful in analyzing the abundance of information in the articles but also 
exercise rigor in finding support for causalities from multiple studies. And, since the 
realist review’s purpose is to act as a basis for policymaking, the recommendations for 
action need to be carefully worded and to avoid stating “hard and fast truths”. (Pawson 
et al., 2005.) 
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4 RESEARCH METHOD AND MATERIAL 
4.1 Research plan 
A systematic literature review is systematically conducted according to rules set a 
priori. There are multiple slightly differing baseline structures of systematic literature 
reviews that are generally followed. Realist review follows mostly the same steps as a 
traditional systematic literature review, with minor differences in emphasis, duration, 
order, and methodological content of each step (Pawson et al., 2004). Table 2 lists the 
differences between the systematic literature review template for meta-analysis as 
presented by Torgerson (2003, p. 24-25) and the realist review template presented by 
Pawson et al. (2004).  
Table 3: Systematic literature review process compared with a realist review process 
Step Systematic Literature Review 
(Torgerson, 2003, p. 24-25) 
Realist Review  
(Pawson et al., 2004) 
1 Write plan of research: 
- Establish research question(s) 
- Establish objectives and scope of 
the review 
- Define the theoretical, empirical 
and conceptual background 
- Establish the methods for searching, 
screening, data extraction, quality 
appraisal and synthesis 
Clarify scope of the review: 
- Identify review question 
- Refine purpose of review 
- Articulate key theories to be explored 
2 Specify inclusion and exclusion criteria. Search for relevant evidence, refining   
inclusion criteria in the light of emerging data. 
3 Search for literature, and optimally screen the 
literature by at least two reviewers. Firstly, 
based on titles and abstracts and secondly 
based on full papers. 
Appraise quality of studies using judgement to 
supplement formal checklists and considering 
relevance and rigour from a ‘fitness for 
purpose’ perspective. 
4 Describe and classify studies. Extract enough 
data for an in-depth review. 
Extract different data from different studies 
using an eclectic and iterative approach. 
5 Quality appraisal for internal and external 
validity, and data extraction. 
Synthesize data to achieve refinement of 
programme theory – that is, to determine what 
works for whom, how and under what 
circumstances. 
6 Summarize extracted data in a synthesis. Make recommendations, especially with 
reference to contextual issues for particular 
policymakers at particular times. 
7 Interpret the synthesized data in a report. Disseminate findings and evaluate extent to 
which existing programmes are adjusted to take 
account of elements of programme theory 
revealed by the review. 
In the following sections in this chapter, the research plan and methods will be 
discussed in detail. The data extraction is presented in an appendix and the synthesis 
is presented in chapter five. The recommendations and evaluation of findings are 
presented in chapters six and seven. 
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This research follows the structure of the Realist Review presented by Pawson et al. 
(2005): 
1. Clarify the scope of the review 
2. Selection of evidence 
3. Appraisal of evidence 
4. Data extraction 
5. Data synthesis 
6. Make recommendations 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
4.2 Scope of the review 
The main question of the review is “what works in PBC, why and in what context?”. 
Still, an equally important question is “what does not work, why, and in what 
context?”. The purpose of the systematic literature review is to find the frontier of PBC 
research and synthesize the findings for decision-making in small- and medium-sized 
firms, to support them in designing a PBC system. 
4.3 Selection of evidence 
4.3.1 Criteria 
In the systematic literature review, this thesis does not distinguish interpretative 
research from positivist research, since limiting the systematic literature review to one 
or the other would significantly narrow down the results and consequently would 
compromise the usefulness of the synthesis to practice. Also, only empirical studies or 
experimental studies are used, and theory papers are excluded. 
Selection criteria for the literature: 
• Includes one of the following search terms: 
o “bonus*” 
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o “performance-based incentive*” 
o “performance-based compensation” 
o “performance-based pay” 
o “performance incentive*” 
o “performance compensation” 
o “performance pay” 
o “pay for performance” 
o “incentive contract*” 
o “incentive system*” 
o “incentive structure*” 
• Addresses white-collar employee, blue-collar employee, or non-executive 
manager performance-based compensation. 
• Is an empirical study, experiment, field test or a case study (i.e. theory, meta-
analysis and comment papers are excluded). 
• Article is published in one of the highly regarded accounting journals: 
o Accounting Research 
o Journal Of Accounting And Economics 
o Journal Of Accounting Research 
o Accounting Review 
o European Accounting Review 
o Journal Of Accounting And Public Policy 
o Journal Of International Accounting Auditing And Taxation 
o Management Accounting Research 
o Review Of Accounting Studies 
o Accounting And Business Research 
o Journal Of Accounting Auditing And Finance 
o Journal Of Business Finance And Accounting 
o Accounting Organizations And Society 
o International Journal Of Accounting 
o Abacus 
o British Accounting Review 
o Accounting Auditing Accountability Journal 
o Accounting Auditing And Accountability Journal 
o Accounting Horizons 
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o Critical Perspectives On Accounting 
o Behavioral Research In Accounting 
o Journal Of Accounting Literature 
o Accounting Forum 
• Is in English. 
• Is available and not behind a paywall. 
The search tool utilized is Elsevier’s Scopus, which includes all the journals listed 
above. The search criteria were defined by using an iterative process with different 
search terms and criteria using a “trial-and-error” process, using various search terms, 
and filtering by the filters available in Scopus. This process is explained in the next 
sections. 
4.3.2 Filtering by publication 
In Scopus without any other filters, searching for “performance-based bonus”, 
“performance-based incentive*”, “performance-based compensation” and 
“performance-based pay” for hits in keywords, abstracts, or article titles finds 464 
articles. This number of hits is very low, since using such rigid search terms drops out 
many studies that study, for example, fairness perceptions and perception of justice in 
bonus systems. If the search terms are changed to the following terms: “bonus*”, 
“incentive*”, “performance-based compensation” and “performance-based pay” the 
number of results increases to 117 260 articles, which is quite expected when using 
commonly occurring words like incentive and bonus. While it is necessary to avoid 
losing relevant PBC articles that do not mention PBC explicitly, filtering PBC 
literature from over a hundred thousand hits is not possible.  
One option would be to filter by the themes based on the research framework but using 
strictly defined variables in the search risks losing relevant studies. The goal is to find 
also a priori unconsidered elements in the framework of variables affecting PBC 
systems. Consequently, it seems the search terms need to have a more supporting role 
than a direct filtering role in this search, so the search terms are left very open-ended, 
and asterisks are used to allow for plural forms of the words. 
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A better way to limit the size of the sample is to limit the scope by selecting journals 
only from the field of accounting, which automatically significantly limits the number 
of articles found with the search terms. Selecting only highly regarded journals also 
ensures that the articles in the literature review are peer-reviewed and held in high 
regard. The weakness of this approach is excluding some “lower-ranked” studies on 
PBC, which have not been published in major publications. This should not be a 
significant issue as the purpose of this review is to find the frontier of PBC research 
and to make sense of the current generally accepted findings. Lacking findings from 
lower-ranked journals would not likely change the overall results of the study, even if 
they would provide additional insight. 
The criterion for choosing the journals is to use Academic Journal Guide ranking. 
Those that have a score of 3 or higher in the accounting section are chosen, since they 
are considered to be the most prestigious journals in the field (Chartered Association 
of Business Schools, 2018). This also ensures the validity of the studies, as the journals 
with a score of 3 or higher are evaluated to publish original and well-executed research 
papers that are held in high regard with good submission rates, heavy refereeing and 
careful selection of the published articles (Chartered Association of Business Schools, 
2018). The only concern of limiting the journals with a score of three instead of 
lowering it to two is that lower-ranked journals might publish more practitioner-
oriented articles (Chartered Association of Business Schools, 2018). However, 
including journals ranked with the score two would increase the number of articles in 
the sample and consequently create an unrealistically high workload. 
4.3.3 Filtering by title, keywords, and abstract 
After filtering by journals, the sample with the search terms “bonus*”, “incentive*”, 
“performance-based compensation”, and “performance-based pay” is 201 articles. 
After the initial searches with the terms, a new term for PBC came up: “pay for 
performance”. Including this search term added further 10 articles to the sample.  
The search terms require the words exactly as stated in the search, for example, 
“performance-based compensation” needs to be exactly in that order instead of 
“performance-based” and “compensation” separately. As a result, it seems that the 
41 
listed search terms leave out some relevant studies. To find out if the current search 
terms have missed relevant articles, I conducted a search that allows the words in any 
order. This search yielded 736 results compared to the previous 211, which I browsed 
through to notice at least 2 articles that were missing from the original sample. While 
browsing, instead of picking these articles directly to the sample or using this sample 
as the base sample, I took the PBC keywords that were used in these articles and added 
them to the search. The reason I do not use this sample by itself is that articles found 
with the looser search terms mostly cover other topics than PBC so the selection of the 
articles would have been even more subjective, prone to error, and difficult to replicate. 
The search terms that were generated from the above method were “incentive 
structure*”, “incentive contract*” and “incentive system*” and yielded additional 82 
articles to create a total sample of 283 articles. 
4.3.4 Filtering by subject and type 
The main goal of the study is to be able to synthesize scientific findings for use in non-
executive PBC systems. Literature about blue-collar PBC systems is included in the 
study since many studies do not distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar PBC. 
Also, blue-collar and white-collar work might sometimes be of equal level of 
complexity, and sometimes white-collar work output being more easily measurable 
than blue-collar work output. From this perspective, research findings for blue-collar 
employees, white-collar employees, and managers are all relevant as it is often difficult 
to distinguish work content and complexity by job title alone. 
CEO compensation, earnings management, and corporate governance are generally 
linked to compensation and bonus literature, but for this thesis, these are out of scope 
and the literature regarding CEO compensation, earnings management, and corporate 
governance are excluded from the realist review. Earnings management literature is 
excluded because most of the time employees and sometimes even managers have very 
limited power to affect earnings management decisions. CEO and Executive 
managers’ decision-making power is considered to be powerful enough to create 
measurable outcomes in firm performance, which makes the evaluation of CEO and 
Executive performance different from employees and managers who do not 
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necessarily contribute much to the quantifiable firm performance metrics by 
themselves. Additionally, the methods of CEO and Executive compensation include 
significantly more equity components for bonus payments and key financial figures as 
performance targets, that are less relevant in PBC at the lower levels of the 
organization. 
Based on these criteria, the articles that focus on executive compensation, earnings 
management, or corporate governance are excluded based on the title. If there is even 
a slight likelihood that the article includes findings for PBC they are evaluated based 
on the abstract, and ultimately based on the content of the article. After filtering by 
search terms and journal the total sample was 283 articles. From this sample, 78 CEO 
and Executive compensation articles were excluded, and 23 earnings management-
related articles were excluded. Additionally, 58 articles were excluded for not being 
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Figure 3: Research locations in the literature review sample 
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4.3.5 Search results 
From the sample of 123, 37 theory articles were excluded after reading through the 
article contents. Four more were excluded due to unavailability or based on the article 
content during the literature review, resulting in a final sample of 82 articles. 
Most of the research in the articles was conducted in Western countries, North America 
(43) and Europe (24) being the most dominant ones, with three articles that were 
labeled “Western” research mixing samples from North America and Europe and two 
articles with international samples. Figure 3 visualizes the lack of Asian research with 
only five articles based on samples from China, Taiwan, and South Korea. The 
published PBC literature in this literature review is completely devoid of South 
American or African research. Based on the focus on Western countries in the 
research, the findings of this literature review apply to Western cultures only, and 
generalizations to other cultures should be approached with care. There are, however, 
large variances within the Western cultures as well.  
 
PBC is ultimately a very young research subject, as is management accounting 











Figure 4: Articles in the literature review sample per year published 
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search are less than 20 years old as can be seen in Figure 4, with the older articles 
mostly handling piece-rate compensation. The articles in this literature review also 
present a wide array of different findings within the subject of PBC, indicating that the 
work to make sense of PBC has only begun. 
4.4 Data extraction 
The findings from the articles will be extracted with the principle presented earlier, 
aiming to form a background for the causality “if (X) then (Y)”, by defining the 
contiguous contexts (C) that are connected (O) via underlying mechanisms (M). 
First, all the articles were read through, and theory papers were excluded. Also, the 
findings from each article were carefully synthesized in the realist review form of 
listing causality by context, connection, and mechanism attempting to grasp the 
fundamental findings of the study without excessive interpretation. This first step of 
the review yielded 57 different realist review statements. Then, the statements were 
synthesized with other studies’ findings, by consolidating information, changing the 
wording, and combining similar findings. This process resulted in the final realist 
review appendix that has 37 statements that answer the 10 hypotheses. The findings 
from the realist review are synthesized in the following chapter. 
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5 REALIST REVIEW 
5.1 The effectiveness of PBC 
First and foremost, PBC is not considered a practice that is always beneficial for firm 
performance. Nevertheless, the literature review shows that most of the time PBC has 
a positive effect. 
Statement 1A 
PBC (C) increases firm performance (O), namely employee performance (O) 
and output quality (O) because PBC increases motivation to perform better 
(M), and motivates employees to learn how to perform better (M). PBC also 
reduces over-optimism (M), increases teamwork (M), and increases goal 
congruence (M). The positive outcome is observed in at least the following 
cases: Work is complex (C), employees have not explicitly voiced a preference 
for money bonuses (C), and PBC is rewarded on dimensions that increase firm 
performance (C). 
Based on the literature review PBC improves the goal congruence and alleviates the 
agency problem. PBC increases firm performance by increasing the employee’s work 
output and quality (Akinyele, Arnold, & Sutton, 2020; Banker, Lee, & Potter, 1996; 
Banker, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000b; Román, 2009; Unger, Szczesny, & Holderried, 
2020) and motivates employees to learn how to do their work better (Banker et al., 
1996, 2000b; Luft, 1994). The majority of studies supporting the effectiveness of PBC 
in the above sentence are quantitative studies conducted in North America. While these 
articles showed that PBC increases teamwork it is likely that in some cultures PBC 
does not have beneficial effect on teamwork, considering Aycan’s (2005) findings that 
in-group harmony is important in collectivist cultures and individual rewards might 
invoke jealousy. Goal congruence and the motivational effect to learn to do the work 
better could be generalizable to outside of North America as well. 
The performance-increasing effects of PBC do not hold in all situations. In some cases, 
PBC has a less beneficial effect, no effect, or even negative effect on firm performance. 
Statement 1B 
PBC (C) is less effective (O) when it makes organizational structures too 
inflexible (M) and when intrinsic motivation is high (C), or employees are 
committed to firm values (C) because employees are motivated by other things 
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than monetary bonuses (M). The ineffectiveness can also be observed when 
employees are not committed to the firm in the long term (C). Additionally, 
strong monitoring (C) reduces the effectiveness of PBC (O), because of 
employees perceiving the monitoring negatively (M). Also, if PBC dimensions 
do not match with desired output (C) the performance is hindered (O) due to 
discouraged effort towards voluntary work (M) and increased misreporting 
(M). 
There are organizations where employees’ internal goals are already aligned with 
organizational goals and the employees are highly motivated to do their work. These 
organizations with high goal congruence are most prevalent in healthcare and non-
profit sectors where the employees have internal motivation to serve their customers 
in the best possible way, like hospitals treating patients or non-profits helping people 
in unfortunate circumstances (Eldenburg, Gaertner, & Goodman, 2015; Kluvers & 
Tippett, 2011). PBC might not be effective if it negatively affects the internal dynamics 
and norms by contradicting with firm values or increasing monitoring and 
organizational stiffness (Eldenburg et al., 2015; Friis, Hansen, & Vámosi, 2015; 
Kluvers & Tippett, 2011). Akinyele et al. (2020) find that when employees are aware 
of their organization’s value statement the effectiveness of PBC is reduced. In 
conclusion, if a firm already has employees who are committed to the firm’s values 
and goals, it is possible that a PBC system will not yield significant effects on 
performance. 
The negative effect and ineffectiveness of PBC in the above contexts is supported by 
studies conducted in Europe and in North America. Many of these studies were 
qualitative as well, indicating that quantitative studies might not grasp the full picture 
of the mechanisms of PBC. It could also be that qualitative studies highlight negative 
outliers and that in large quantitative samples these are not necessarily statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, PBC has a risk of being ineffective or having negative effects 
in any cultures when certain contexts and mechanisms mentioned above are in place. 
5.2 Performance measurement 
The basis for compensating for performance is accurately measuring performance. In 
reality, completely accurate performance measurement in white-collar work does not 
exist. There are always dimensions of work that are difficult to capture with objective 
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metrics, like helping other employees, taking time to put the effort into client relations, 
contributing to developing the workplace, and other efforts that do not show in the 
bottom line. At worst, these efforts are crucial to the firm but are not adequately 
captured in performance measurement and the PBC system incentivizes the employee 
to stop putting effort into these key tasks (Eldenburg et al., 2015; Merchant & 
Riccaboni, 1990). If the performance cannot be measured accurately, the weight on 
PBC could be reduced and more emphasis put on fixed compensation (Ittner, C. D., 
Larcker, & Pizzini, 2007).  
Statement 2A 
When performance measurement is possible to do more accurately (C), and the 
weight on PBC can be increased (C) the performance is increased (O), due to 
reduced compression bias (M). Accurate external performance standards (C) 
also mitigate gaming issues (O) as external targets cannot be manipulated (M). 
The statement 2A is formed based on studies from Europe, North America and Asia. 
Notably, even with relatively low bonuses the employee performance increases when 
the performance measurement is accurate (Unger et al., 2020). Ahn, Hwang and Kim 
(2010) and Unger et al. (2020) find that objective measures are superior to subjective 
measures to achieve that accuracy. Ahn et al. (2010) argue that one of the reasons that 
objective measures are better is that it reduces the compression bias, which is the 
tendency of subjective evaluation to mediate towards averages. Murphy (2000) 
suggests that objective measures should use external targets to avoid manager 
manipulation. 
Statement 2B 
Suboptimal dimensions of measurement (C) risk poor performance (O) because 
of short-term focus (M), earnings management (M), or misleading targets (M). 
The statement 2B explains the same effect, but in reverse to the statement 2A, phrasing 
that suboptimal performance measurement risks reduced performance. Huang, 
Marquardt and Zhang (2014) show that increasing weight on rewarding based on EPS 
growth can risk overleveraging or avoidance of EPS dilution, which in some cases can 
be harmful to overall firm performance. Additionally, Baker et al. (1994) show 
multiple examples where the measurement of wrong things has caused significant 
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trouble for the firm as managers try to maximize their earnings by engaging in 
suboptimal activities. 
In conclusion, the benefit of accurate performance measures based on objective 
measures and unmanipulable targets is undeniable. However, in many instances 
accurate performance measurement is not possible, and the firm needs to find a 
compromise to direct the employees’ effort towards the right things. 
5.3 Subjective measures, peer-reviews, and manager discretion 
Objective performance measures rarely grasp all the dimensions of performance, 
especially when environments are uncertain, and work is very complex and difficult 
to measure by quantifiable outputs. To alleviate the problem, subjective performance 
evaluation can be used to complement imperfect objective performance measurement, 
which makes it also possible to increase the weight on PBC without harmful side-
effects (Anderson, Dekker, Sedatole, & Wiersma, 2020; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der 
Stede, & Vargus, 2004; Woods, 2012). The firm can utilize team-based performance 
measurement, peer-reviewing, manager discretion and subjective performance 
measurement dimensions. 
Subjective performance measures could be for example annual subjective performance 
evaluations or peer-reviews. The dimensions of measurement can be, for example, 
helping colleagues and customer satisfaction. In addition, manager discretion can be 
used to define how much bonus should be paid, how bonus pools should be allocated 
between teams and team members, and whether targets should be changed 
retrospectively based on changes in external factors that have affected the achievement 
of bonus targets. Subjective performance measurement is much less straightforward 
than objective performance measurement, resulting in seven realist review statements. 
Statement 3A 
Subjective PBC (C) is effective in supporting objective PBC (O) when 
objective measures fail to encourage cooperation (M) or long-term focus (M), 
and when objective performance is noisy (M). Also, effectiveness is elevated 
when the strategic business unit is young (C), creativity is required (C), and in 
the case of team-based PBC, the team tasks are not interdependent of each 
other (C). 
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The especially important mechanism in the statement 3A is that subjective PBC has a 
key role in encouraging long-term focus (Aranda, Arellano, & Davila, 2019; Gibbs et 
al., 2004). These effects are observed in North America, Asia and Europe, with the 
majority being quantitative studies based on data from large firms or databases. Most 
of the studies behind the above statement also utilize data directly collected from 
employees. 
Statement 3B 
The use of nonfinancial and HR measures (C), especially in situations with 
strong interdependence between business units (C), is beneficial (O) when pay 
structure is hierarchical and the human capital has strong emphasis (M) when 
nonfinancial measures can reduce the noise of accounting measures (M) and 
because of metrics with long-term emphasis like customer satisfaction (M). 
The statement 3B adds detail to the statement 3A by providing more detailed context, 
especially the use of nonfinancial and HR measures as the measures. The generalizable 
statement is that the nonfinancial measures complement financial measures well and 
increase cooperation in a setting where the human capital has strong emphasis in the 
business unit (Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000a; Bouwens & Van Lent, 2007). 
The details of mechanics are from different studies based on quantitative real-life data 
in Europe and North America. Two of the studies explore employee-level data and one 
study utilizes firm-level aggregate data. 
Statement 3C 
Subjectivity can be used (C) to counter environmental heterogeneity (O) in 
commonly used firm-wide PBC contracts (M) because environmental 
uncertainty makes the PBC effect more muted (M). 
As mentioned in chapter two, accuracy in performance measurement is a key element 
in an effective PBC system. The statement 3C is based on quantitative research from 
North America, Europe and Australia utilizing real life aggregate branch-level data in 
two studies and employee-level data in one study. Aranda et al. (2019), Anderson et 
al. (2020) and Abernethy, Dekker and Schulz (2015) conclude that if a firm uses a 
general PBC system for all of its business units across the world, the subjectivity 
allows for adjusting for environmental uncertainty. Although, the discretion power in 
distributing bonuses that is usually given to combat such environmental uncertainty 
does not always result in more accurate PBC, as stated in statement 3G. In the context 
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of PBC the discretion in distributing bonuses and subjective performance 
measurement can slightly overlap, but generally subjective performance measures 
mean non-objective performance measurement methods and discretion in distributing 
bonuses means ex-post adjustments of bonus levels on manager discretion. 
Statement 3D 
Peer-review-based PBC (C) increases performance (O), because of the higher 
accuracy of compensation in a team setting (M) and limited risk of bias in peer-
review quality (M) especially when teams are homogenous (M). Peer-
reviewing also promotes knowledge sharing (M). Peer-review is also effective 
(O) when cooperation and knowledge sharing among team members is 
beneficial for the member (M), especially when the team members are team-
oriented instead of individually oriented (C). 
To utilize subjective dimensions of performance in PBC, someone needs to conduct 
the subjective review. The most successful scenario in subjective evaluation is when a 
team, which has good knowledge of each other’s tasks and performance, conducts a 
peer-review on top of the manager reviews (Arnold, Hannan, & Tafkov, 2018; 
Haesebrouck, Van den Abbeele, & Williamson, 2021). Additionally, if the team 
members benefit from knowledge sharing and cooperation, peer-reviewing is effective 
(Arnold et al., 2018; Haesebrouck, Cools, & Van Den Abbeele, 2018). The benefits do 
not only come in increased performance because of increased accuracy in subjective 
evaluation but also because the employee has an incentive for knowledge sharing and 
cooperation since those are the dimensions that reward the PBC (Haesebrouck et al., 
2018, 2021; Kuang & Moser, 2011). 
The statement 3D is based on North American and European experimental studies 
conducted on university students, with only Hwang, Erkens and Evans (2009) 
supporting the benefit of knowledge sharing with empirical evidence from 1780 North 
American manufacturing managers. Despite the lack of empirical evidence from the 
field, peer-reviews as a complement to manager review seems to increase performance 
when the team members benefit from knowledge sharing and teamwork. 
Statement 3E 
With a heterogenous team, (C) team-based PBC is less effective (O) with both 
subjective manager evaluation (C) and peer-review evaluation (C) because the 
inability to accurately review peers causes performance-reward mismatch (M), 
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and discretion in manager evaluation reduces team cohesion and discourages 
helping (M). 
In statement 3E the wording is important. While the team-based PBC in suboptimal 
context is less effective, it still is effective in increasing performance (Arnold et al., 
2018; Arnold, & Tafkov, 2019). However, the statement 3E works only as a supportive 
claim to the statement 3D at best since the statement 3E is supported only two 
experimental studies on university students which are both conducted by basically the 
same researchers. Nonetheless, the statement clarifies some of the contexts and 
mechanisms where there is a risk of inaccurate performance evaluation even when 
utilizing manager evaluation and peer-reviews. 
Statement 3F 
Subjective performance measures (C) induce uncertainty and perceptions of 
favoritism in evaluation (O) when subjectivity allows the managers to evaluate 
based on inappropriate criteria (C) and change the criteria rapidly (C) because 
subjective measures are susceptible to manager’s prejudice and bias (M). 
Namely, managers tend to mediate extreme reviews (M), punish good 
performers less than bad performers (M) and at worst, poorly evaluate 
employees they wish to push out of the organization (M). 
The statement 3F presents the opposite argument to the hypothesis. Specifically, using 
subjective performance measurement in PBC can sometimes introduce negative 
effects. The context where subjectivity allows for measurement on inappropriate 
criteria and gives excessive evaluation power to manager seems to facilitate the 
mechanisms that yield negative outcomes. The findings are based on quantitative, 
qualitative, and experimental data. The evidence includes a study on firm-level 
aggregate data from South Korea as well as studies from Europe and North America. 
In short, utilizing subjective performance measures is not a shortcut to happiness but 
the contexts and mechanisms need to be considered when designing the subjective 
measures to the PBC. 
Statement 3G 
Giving managers discretionary power over distributing bonuses (C) does not 
make bonus payments more accurate (O) due to anchoring heuristic (M) and 
reluctance to make downward adjustments (M), and manager tendency to battle 
unfairness more than promote fairness even if it incurs extra costs in evaluation 
(M). Especially during shocks (C) managers are reluctant to make changes to 
avoid upsetting the employees (M).  
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As statement 3G shows, giving managers discretionary power over bonus payments 
does not come without downsides. Managers might evaluate inappropriately out of 
ignorance or to further their personal goals, and are subject to bias and prejudice (Bol, 
Estep, Moers, & Peecher, 2018; Bol, Hecht, & Smith, 2015; Upton & Arrington, 
2012). Also, managers tend to avoid extreme reviews effectively punishing good 
performers and rewarding poor performers (Ahn et al., 2010; Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 
2003). The additional burden of evaluation might cause the manager to acquire costly 
performance information to make more accurate evaluations (Maas, Van Rinsum, & 
Towry, 2012). The benefit of the discretion is the increased fairness in PBC and 
increased manager awareness on the dimensions that are measured and how the 
manager can affect them even if the objective accuracy is hindered (Maas et al., 2012; 
Tuomela, 2005). The statement is supported by experimental studies on university 
students in North America and Europe, as well as a qualitative study from Europe and 
a quantitative study from an international audit firm. 
This statement does not state if giving the manager discretionary power in bonus 
distribution can be beneficial to firm performance. Giving managers discretionary 
power in ex-post target adjustment has a performance-increasing effect because the 
achievement of targets increases the perception of fairness (Voußem et al., 2016) and 
it has the potential to decrease year-end stagnation in performance for those who have 
already met the targets as well as those who are way behind the targets (Knauer, 
Sommer, & Wöhrmann, 2017). The benefits of managers being able to make 
discretionary ex-post adjustments are further discussed in chapters 5.4 and 5.8. 
5.4 Fairness perceptions 
The PBC is expected to have a better effect in increasing the firm performance if the 
employee perceives the PBC as fair (Burney, Henle, & Widener, 2009; Grabner & 
Martin, 2021). Even more importantly, if the employee perceives the PBC as unfair 
the firm performance is likely decreased (Grabner & Martin, 2021; Liu & Zhang, 2015; 
Oblak et al., 2018). 
Statement 4A 
The fairer the employee perceives the PBC (C), the better the organizational 
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performance (O) because organizational citizenship behavior increases (M) and 
motivation increases (M), and vice versa if the PBC is perceived as unfair (C) 
it hinders performance (O). 
Statement 4B 
Employees perceive PBC as fairer (O) when the firm signals trust (M). For 
example, when PBC has increased technical validity (C), it reflects the firm 
strategy (C), by offering signing bonus (C), utilizing subjective performance 
measures (C), or by offering choice in bonus contract type (bonus/penalty) (C) 
and the firm has an otherwise legitimate and fair compensation policy (C). 
A consequence of inaccurate measurement of performance is the risk of employees 
perceiving the PBC system as unfair. Perceiving the PBC as fair increases 
organizational citizenship behavior which increases firm performance (Burney et al., 
2009; Oblak et al., 2018; Voußem et al., 2016). Voußem et al. (2016) define an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between fairness perceptions and emphasis on subjective 
metrics in evaluation. This highlights the importance of supporting the objective 
metrics with subjective metrics, and that utilizing subjective metrics to complement 
objective metrics likely increases the employees’ perceptions of fairness. Oblak et al. 
(2018) mention that employees compare themselves with others, so having fair 
compensation compared to their peers is more important to them than how the 
compensation itself is determined. There is a difference in how different personalities 
and cultures perceive the fairness of PBC. For example, ambitious individuals that are 
more skilled and risk-tolerant prefer having a PBC contract over not having one 
(Brown, Farrington, & Sprinkle, 2016; Fehrenbacher, Kaplan, & Pedell, 2017). 
The studies supporting claims 4A and 4B are mostly based in North America, with two 
studies from Europe. Both experimental settings on university students and 
quantitative data from the field have been used in the studies. 
5.5 Personal and cultural differences 
There are widely varying differences between people and cultures how PBC is 
perceived and which kind of contract framing employees prefer. The statement 5B has 
slightly overlapping findings with the chapter 5.7 about contract framing but is treated 
in this chapter from the perspective of employee preference differences. 
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Statement 5A 
Individuals (C) tend to prefer contracts with PBC (O) when they are more 
skilled, prefer more risk, look for achievements and blame themselves less for 
shortcomings (M). 
The statement 5A is based on two experimental studies conducted on university 
students in North America and in Europe. The statement supports the general 
understanding that ambitious individuals prefer compensation system that rewards on 
good performance. 
Statement 5B 
Involving the employee in the negotiation of PBC metrics and targets (C) does 
not yield good results (O), because employees do not necessarily know what 
drives their work performance (M), they might sandbag the budgeting process 
(M) and they generally choose PBC system that appears less risky even if it is 
less valuable (M). 
It is rarely beneficial to heavily involve employees in the setting of targets of their own 
PBC. While the statement 5B mentions that involving employees in the planning of 
PBC metrics and targets does contain mostly negative findings, it is important to not 
completely alienate employees from the process as it risks the performance targets 
being perceived as unfair (Grabner & Martin, 2021). The statement 5B is supported by 
both experimental and quantitative data, but only by studies conducted in North 
America. There is a risk that the statement is inaccurate in other cultural settings than 
in North America. For example, Lourenço (2020) finds that PBC is more effective 
specifically for those who report a low preference for it. This could be a cultural 
difference since in Europe the preference for material success is lower than in North 
America, so the lower preference for monetary compensation could be explained by 
differences between Europe and North America. But, Lourenço’s study is conducted 
in North America. This suggests that there are cultural nuances in PBC that are very 
difficult to grasp in any generalization. 
Statement 5C 
There are large regional differences in PBC (O), as Chinese and European 
firms use PBC more rarely than North American firms (C), because of lack of 
experience with PBC systems (M) – especially when firms are state owned (O). 
Additionally, differences can be caused by significantly higher tax rate 
reducing the net reward (M), differences in power distance (M) and lower level 
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of cultural preference for competitiveness, achievement, and material success 
(M). 
As the statement 5C reveals, the mechanisms behind the cultural differences are 
complex and unclear. There are interesting studies by Merchant, Van der Stede, Lin 
and Yu (2011), Jansen, Merchant and Van der Stede (2009) and Gibbs et al. (2004) 
that conduct similar research in different cultural settings. Drawing any single definite 
conclusion of the effect of cultural differences from the findings is difficult. These 
studies are a good start to the research of cultural differences in PBC, however. The 
effect of cultural differences might be a single biggest mystery in the contexts and 
mechanisms of PBC. Merchant et al. (2011) suggest further studies isolating the 
variables that could cause differences like the cultural importance of personal 
relationships over rules, cultural leadership styles and the researched industry 
differences. 
5.6 Employee attraction and retention 
On top of motivating employees, PBC systems can work as a tool to attract and retain 
talent (Banker et al., 2000a). Also, the nature of the PBC system can attract a certain 
type of individuals and be used already at employee selection (Abernethy et al., 2015). 
Statement 6A 
PBC (C) can be used to choose and attract skilled employees (O) because 
people who share the goals and risk tolerance are attracted by specific PBC 
attributes (M). 
The statement 6A is supported by both experimental evidence and field data from three 
studies conducted in North America and one utilizing aggregate firm-level data from 
Australia. It seems that PBC is generally effective as one of the factors that attract new 
skilled employees and can also function as the selection of employees as more 
ambitious employees tend to prefer PBC contracts. 
Statement 6B 
PBC (C) can have a positive effect in retaining employees (O), by lowering 
performance targets (M), or a negative effect (O) by utilizing penalty contracts 
(M) especially when employees are skilled and high-quality (C). 
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Quantitative studies from North America and China assess the power of PBC in 
retaining employees, as stated in statement 6B. PBC has generally a positive effect on 
retaining employees when performance targets are met, but Van der Stede, Wu, A., 
and Wu, S. Y. C. (2020) find that employee turnover increases when PBC utilizes 
penalty contracts. It has been a long-standing question if penalty contracts are better 
than bonus contracts at exerting effort from employees, but penalty contracts seem to 
cause unintended cost by making the firm unattractive for new skilled employees. 
5.7 Contract framing and risk 
As mentioned in chapter 5.6, penalty contracts are not necessarily better than bonus 
contracts despite being more effective at exerting performance from employees. Bonus 
contracts are considered the safer, cheaper, and more universally effective choice in 
PBC (Luft, 1994; Van der Stede et al., 2020) 
Statement 7A 
Bonus contract, compared to penalty contract (C) is more effective (O) when 
targets are defined ex-post (C). When contracts are incomplete (C) bonus 
instead of a penalty (C) or giving the employee a choice between the two (C), 
indicates trust to the employee (M), and, on the opposite, using a penalty 
accelerates employee turnover (M). Employees also perceive a bonus better 
than a penalty (M). In the case where employees can affect the manager’s 
penalty (C), there is also the possibility of retaliation against the manager (M). 
The statement 7A suffers from the weakness that only one study out of the seven 
behind this statement is from real-life data and the rest are experiments. The empirical 
study was conducted in China while the experiments were conducted in various North 
American participant groups, indicating that the findings could hold universally. 
Generally, though, bonus contract seems to be the more attractive option of the 
contract frames. 
Statement 7B 
Using a penalty contract instead of a bonus contract is more powerful at 
exerting effort from employees (O) if employees perceive the compensation 
and organization as fair (C), because employees’ tendency for loss aversion 
(M), but it also increases risk-taking (O). 
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In some settings penalty contracts are found to increase employee effort more than 
bonus contracts (Christ & Vance, 2018; Oblak et al., 2018; Van der Stede et al., 2020). 
Also, some employees rather choose penalty contracts over bonus contracts to exert 
more effort from themselves (Gonzalez, Hoffman, & Moser, 2020). Penalty contracts, 
despite all the negative effects, are efficient at exerting higher performance from 
employees if the compensation is perceived as fair (Christ & Vance, 2018; Oblak et 
al., 2018; Van der Stede et al., 2020). Nonetheless, if penalties are used in PBC there 
is a high risk that some employees perceive the penalties negatively, potentially 
nullifying the positive performance effects. The more significant problem from a 
penalty contract is the increased risk-taking unless that is the goal of the business unit. 
The statement 7B is based on very similar sample of studies as the statement 7A, with 
two experimental studies and the same quantitative study from a Chinese sample as in 
7A. It is generally accepted that penalties are more effective at exerting effort than 
bonuses in a controlled setting, so it is likely that the statement 7B is somewhat 
generalizable. 
Statement 7C 
Employee risk-taking can be avoided (O) by careful feedback of poor 
performance (C) because employees tend to compensate for poor performance 
by taking risk (M), by utilizing clawback provisions in high-risk investments 
(C) because managers are more liable for results (M), and by utilizing bonus 
instead of penalty contracts (C), especially in decisions that only affect loss 
size (M). 
The increased risk-taking is not something a firm usually wishes to achieve with PBC. 
Clawback provisions can be utilized as a risk-moderating tool as clawback provisions 
lead to reduced risk-taking due to human tendency for loss aversion (Brink & Rankin, 
2013). Careful giving of feedback on poor performance also mitigates the risk of 
employee feeling the need to compensate for poor performance by taking more risk. 
However, the statement 7C is only based on studies from experimental settings. The 
effect of these mechanisms and contexts in risk management need to be carefully 
evaluated as the sample does not present empirical real-life evidence on this statement. 
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5.8 Goals and targets 
Setting the goals and performance targets for the employee is critical to achieving the 
performance-increasing effect. The organization must design the performance targets 
and annual goals so that the employee is motivated and focuses on the tasks that 
increase firm performance. Achieving goal congruence is not helpful if the goals do 
not reflect the firm strategy. 
Statement 8A 
Long-term performance can be increased (O) with greater reliance on long-run 
targets (C) because of increased long-term goal congruence (M), with deferral 
of bonus payments (C) or the use of stock as a bonus payment (C) because of 
the non-instant reward that rewards long-term focus (M). 
If the organization wishes to focus on long-term growth, long-term targets are 
beneficial. Especially in a young business unit, the utilization of long-run targets 
increases performance (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). On top of long-term targets, 
long-horizon bonus payments like deferral of bonus payments and stock options 
encourage long-term focus (Chen, 2003; Cheng, Dinh, Schultze, & Assel, 2019). 
The statement 8A is led by the oldest and one of the most cited studies in the sample. 
Govindarajan and Gupta’s (1985) North American research on general managers of 
strategic business units studies the linkage between control systems and strategy, 
where the target setting is a key element. The same findings have since been confirmed 
with three other studies in the sample from North America, Asia and Europe. Both 
experimental and quantitative studies are utilized, indicating that it is likely that 
generally long-term targets and long-horizon rewards increase the firm’s long-term 
performance. 
Statement 8B 
High profitability firms (C) do not adjust targets upwards when they are 
achieved (O) but adjust targets downwards when they are not achieved (O), to 
signal a commitment to long-term and alleviate incentive conflicts (M), while 
low-profitability firms engage in target ratcheting (C) that decreases 
performance (O) due to mixed motivation from penalizing good performance 
(M). Gaming and target ratcheting can be avoided (O) by utilizing peer 
performance comparison (C) because of increased accountability (M). 
Especially when peer-group is high quality (C), and if peer performance targets 
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can be defined ex-post instead of ex-ante (C) because higher targets can be set 
initially, and then adjusted (M). 
The initial performance targets need to be realistic but challenging, as mentioned in 
goal-setting theory by Locke and Latham (2006). Often firms allow for ex-post 
adjustment of performance targets to maintain perception of fairness in PBC. 
Especially in heterogenous teams and organizations, it is difficult to avoid unfair bonus 
distribution based on only ex-ante targets as employee performance could vary and 
environmental negative shocks might affect only a part of the organization. Still, 
negative shocks are not the only source of concern. Good performance or positive 
external shocks in performance might lead to target ratcheting. Target ratcheting 
means when a set target is achieved, and the target is then increased for the next period 
– effectively punishing a good performer for achieving the targets. Well-performing 
organizations rarely adjust targets upward after a year of good performance, in other 
words, they do not engage in target ratcheting (Aranda et al., 2019; Indjejikian, 
Matějka, Merchant, & Van der Stede, 2014; Murphy, 2000). On the contrary, after a 
year of poor performance and not achieving targets, well-performing organizations 
tend to attempt to motivate employees by lowering the performance targets for the next 
year (Aranda et al., 2019; Indjejikian et al., 2014). 
The statement 8B is complex and supported by quantitative real-life data from both 
Europe and North America. Behind the complexity of the mechanisms and contexts 
lies a simple generalization. Target ratcheting is not beneficial and adjusting targets 
downwards is beneficial when targets are not achieved. 
Statement 8C 
Difficult targets increase performance (O) in a team setting (C) by creating 
norms within the teams that promote supporting and higher performance (M). 
Target difficulty and PBC are complements when difficulty is high (M), so 
increasing PBC while increasing difficulty (C) mitigates performance reduction 
due to increased difficulty (O). 
The goal-setting theory establishes that the more difficult the targets, the better the 
performance. The goal-setting theory expresses that the targets should be challenging 
but realistic, and the more difficult the target the better the reward should be (Locke & 
Latham, 2006). While this is fundamentally true, it is an oversimplification of both 
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goal-setting theory and the setting of targets in PBC systems. The goal-setting theory 
states that the fundamental performance driver is job motivation – the willingness to 
work towards the target. To invoke this willingness, on top of the pride in achieving 
difficult targets, the targets need to be clear and specific, the feedback from 
performance needs to be accurate and appropriate and it is sometimes beneficial to 
involve the employees in setting the targets (Hannan et al., 2008; Locke & Latham, 
2006; Lourenço, 2020). 
Matějka and Ray (2017) suggest that PBC and target difficulty are complements, and 
to achieve the best effect PBC should be increased with target difficulty. This would 
support the assumption that a firm cannot endlessly make targets more difficult to 
increase performance. Additionally, considering the statements 8B and 8D, the most 
beneficial setting would include initially difficult targets set ex-ante that can then be 
adjusted ex-post to increase the perception of fairness by achieving the targets. The 
statement 8C is supported by only two North American studies, but the statement’s 
generalization is in line with the goal-setting theory and merely explains some of the 
mechanisms and contexts behind the effectiveness of difficult targets. 
Statement 8D 
Achievement of targets increases performance (O) because it enhances 
distributive fairness perception of employees (M) and because in a tournament 
setting (C) the increased number of winners reduces stagnation of performance 
of the top and bottom performers (M). If the number of employees who get the 
rewards in a tournament setting is low (C) it decreases performance (O) 
because of risk of sabotage (M) and low performers giving up early (M). 
While difficult targets increase performance (Abul-Ezz, 1993; Locke & Latham, 2006; 
Matějka & Ray, 2017), not achieving targets decreases performance (Hartmann & 
Schreck, 2018; Knauer et al., 2017). The studies from experimental settings 
demonstrate this in a tournament setting where the achievement of targets, in other 
words a large proportion of winners in the tournament, produces higher performance 
than if there are only a few winners. The weakness of statement 8D is that the 
tournament setting causalities are only proven in experimental settings on university 
students. The quantitative study by Voußem et al. (2016) is the only study utilizing 
real-life data behind this claim. The key takeaway is the same as in 8C: achieving of 
targets increases the perception of fairness and consequently performance. In other 
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words, it is important for a well-functioning PBC that the employees feel like they can 
achieve their PBC targets. 
5.9 Implementation 
As Ittner et al. (2003) state, “implementation issues may be far more important to the 
success or failure of a balanced scorecard system than the scorecard’s technical 
attributes”. The same applies to nearly all performance measurement and PBC 
systems. While the technical validity is important, more important point is that the 
PBC is rewarded based on dimensions that reflect the strategy and organizational 
goals, and that the employees are welcoming of the new PBC system. If a system fails 
implementation, it does not matter how well it is constructed or designed. In addition 
to aiming for a successful implementation of the PBC system, the design and 
implementation process can also be an opportunity to crystallize and communicate the 
organizational goals and strategy. 
Statement 9A 
Implementation of PBC is a critical part and can succeed in increasing firm 
performance (O) by implementing during a time of good performance (C), 
because managers become more accepting of the system when it gives them 
more income (M). If management is motivated the implementation also 
facilitates collective learning and discussion about organizational goals and 
strategy (M), which also encourages other intra-organizations to adopt the PBC 
(O). 
The statement 9A is supported by both quantitative and qualitative data, with three 
European studies and one quantitative North American study. The statement grasps 
the important factor when implementing any new system: the benefit of discussion. 
Tuomela (2005) and Ittner et al. (2003) find that the co-operation during the 
implementation was nearly as important as the functionality of the PBC system itself. 
Additionally, Merchant and Riccaboni (1990) state the obvious that if the PBC system 
yields good benefits the employees are much more likely to view the new system 
favourably, so implementing a PBC system during a period of growth and good 
profitability has higher success than implementation during a tougher period. 
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Statement 9B 
PBC is an evolving process in an organization (C), so benefits are only realized 
after some time (O). 
The statement 9B continues where the statement 9A left. On top of the aforementioned 
factors in implementation, the implementation needs time and effort to continuously 
develop the system. Sprinkle (2000) demonstrates that even in a controlled 
experimental setting the effects of PBC did not occur until the 15th period of a total of 
60 periods. Bol and Moers (2010) concur with their findings from a European 
quantitative study and add that the learning does not stop at the implementation, but 
constant improvement is crucial in a PBC system implementation. 
5.10 Feedback, recognition, and promotion incentives 
While the focus of this thesis is on monetary incentives, this section briefly covers the 
non-monetary incentive findings from the literature. Feedback is discussed in multiple 
studies, yet in PBC literature the results are mixed if feedback is effective in increasing 
performance. 
Statement 10A 
Providing feedback to the employee (C) has mixed results (O). Relative 
performance feedback increases the performance (O) when the employee is 
compensated based on individual performance (C) but decreases the 
performance (O) if the employee performs worse than their peers (C). Some 
employees have no performance-affecting reaction to feedback at all despite 
the content (O). The situational differences arise because some employees 
appreciate the feedback as a valuable resource (M) and poor performers 
compensate poor feedback by doing unrelated tasks or taking more risks (M). 
The statement 10A is based on three North American studies, two experimental and 
one based on data from a sales division of an US retail firm. The response to feedback 
is very likely dependent on culture, so this statement likely would need more evidence 
outside of North America. Nevertheless, the statement highlights the complexity of the 
effect of feedback. 
Statement 10B 
Recognition (C) because of an innate human desire for distinction (M), and, in 
the case of an employee who is more motivated by career progression than 
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monetary rewards (C) implicit incentive to get promoted (M), leads to increase 
in performance (O). 
Based on statement 10B, professional recognition and career growth are possible 
factors to consider when designing PBC. In some cases, PBC can be effectively 
complemented with recognition awards and implicit promises to get promoted after a 
good performance. However, the evidence from this sample is hardly conclusive as 
only two studies support statement 10B while the whole chapter 5.10 only refers to 
four studies in total, and three of them are from North America. 
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis explores the literature about performance-based compensation for non-
executive managers and collects findings from various elements of PBC. PBC is, most 
of the time, beneficial for firm performance. A sufficiently well implemented PBC 
system improves goal congruence, alleviates agency problem, increases employee 
work output, and increases work quality (Akinyele et al., 2020; Banker et al., 1996, 
2000b; Román, 2009; Unger et al., 2020). PBC can also motivate the employees to 
learn to do their work better (Banker et al., 1996, 2000b; Luft, 1994) and can encourage 
cooperation among employees (Haesebrouck et al., 2018; Hwang et al., 2009; Román, 
2009). PBC system and the PBC implementation process can help the company 
communicate their values and strategy to their employees to increase clarity and goal 
congruence within the organization (Bol & Moers, 2010; Tuomela, 2005; Widener, 
2006). PBC can also support in new skilled employee recruitment by signaling firm 
values and attracting ambitious employees who prefer PBC contracts (Abernethy et 
al., 2015; Brink & Rankin, 2013; Brown et al., 2016). One of the PBC system’s main 
drivers of performance is increasing the employee commitment to the organization. 
However, if the employees are already very committed and have high intrinsic 
motivation to perform, implementing a PBC system does not yield significant benefits 
(Eldenburg et al., 2015; Kluvers & Tippett, 2011). This could be the case in, for 
example, healthcare and non-profit sectors, where employees are value-driven and 
have a high intrinsic motivation. 
PBC system needs to be designed and implemented well enough. A poorly 
implemented PBC is likely rejected by the employees and the PBC scheme is 
discontinued very quickly (Bol & Moers, 2010; Ittner et al., 2003). At worst, a poorly 
designed PBC system can cause significant harm to the firm by motivating the 
employees to do harmful actions to increase their short-term bonuses (Chen, 2003; 
Ittner et al., 2003; Jansen et al., 2009; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). Generally, utilizing bonus 
contracts is more beneficial than penalty contracts (Christ, Sedatole, & Towry, 2012; 
Christ & Vance, 2018; Gonzalez et al., 2020; Van der Stede et al., 2020). Also, 
subjective performance measurement is a good complement to objective performance 
measurement to improve perceptions of fairness of the PBC (Burney et al., 2009; 
Grabner & Martin, 2021) and encourage cooperation, increase employee commitment, 
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and promote creativity (Anderson et al., 2020; Gibbs et al., 2004; Grabner, 2014). 
Subjectivity in performance evaluation and allowing for manager discretion in 
distribution of bonuses also helps when an internationally operating firm utilizes only 
a single PBC system, as it does not usually account for the regional differences. In 
these cases, the manager can adjust the bonuses to match the real performance and 
consequently increase the performance of the employees (Anderson et al., 2020; 
Aranda et al., 2019). Giving managers discretionary power needs to be done with 
caution, as managers tend to have bias and prejudice in their evaluation and can in 
some cases be harmful to the firm (Bol et al., 2015, 2018; Upton & Arrington, 2012). 
A way to alleviate manager bias is to utilize peer-reviews from colleagues to 
complement manager reviews, especially when the team-members are aware and 
knowledgeable of each other’s work (Arnold et al., 2018; Drake, Haka, & Ravenscroft, 
1999). The utilization of subjective evaluation is especially effective in increasing the 
perception of fairness. Perception of fairness is a significant driver of good 
performance in a firm and vice versa – perceptions of unfairness have a significant 
negative effect on performance (Burney et al., 2009; Oblak et al., 2018; Voußem et al., 
2016). If the employees perceive the PBC system to have sufficient technical validity 
and that their compensation is fair compared to their peers, the PBC system is generally 
considered as fair (Burney et al., 2009; Oblak et al., 2018). 
While it is important to have sufficiently accurate performance measurements to retain 
the perception of fairness, the setting of goals is another challenge in PBC. As goal-
setting theory establishes, difficult targets and achievement of targets increase 
performance (Locke & Latham, 2006). External goals pose the difficulty of being 
subjective to external shocks while internally measured goals are sometimes subject 
to manipulation. The difficulty of accurately measuring objective performance can be 
balanced with subjective performance measurement, and balancing between fixed 
salary and PBC, as the weight on PBC can be increased when the measurements are 
more accurate (Ittner et al., 2007). If there is a large number of winners in a tournament 
setting or if targets are adjusted ex-post to provide rewards despite the employee not 
quite meeting the targets, the employee performance is the most likely to increase 
(Knauer et al., 2017; Voußem et al., 2016). Additionally, setting long-term targets and 
utilizing long-horizon bonus payments like deferral of bonus payments or using stock 
66 
as bonus payments will encourage long-term focus in decision-making (Chen, 2003; 
Cheng et al., 2019; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This thesis conducts a systematic literature review of performance-based 
compensation literature of non-executive managers. The literature grows more and 
more detailed every year with increasing amount of PBC studies released every year. 
Regular systematic literature reviews of the findings keep the frontier of PBC research 
accessible. This thesis adds to the normative research base of management accounting 
research, as the thesis is constructed from the practical point of view to support 
decision-making in firms that are designing and implementing a PBC system. 
Additionally, this thesis tests a novel method in management accounting: a realist 
review, which contributes to management accounting research by introducing a new 
systematic literature review method. 
The subjects are explored in 11 hypotheses. The 10 hypotheses regarding PBC explore 
10 themes: PBC effectiveness, performance measurement, subjective performance 
measurement and manager discretion, perceptions of fairness, cultural differences, 
employee attraction and retention, contract framing, target setting, implementation, 
and feedback. The 11th hypothesis studies if realist review is an effective method in 
management accounting research. The hypotheses are formed based on the theory and 
the customized research framework. The framework is constructed by combining 
Bonner and Sprinkle’s (2002) framework on PBC with Franco-Santos et al. (2012) and 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) frameworks of performance measurement. 
The systematic literature review is conducted on articles published in the highest 
valued accounting journals, including both experimental studies and empirical studies. 
The final sample is 82 articles that are reviewed with the realist review method. The 
realist review method is a systematic literature review method that aims to synthesize 
studies for research-based decision-making. Realist review was introduced in 1997 by 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) and is most commonly used in health sector studying the 
effectiveness of interventions. The method aims to explain causalities by presenting 
the context in which something is happening, the mechanism of how it is happening, 
why it is happening and how the mechanism and context are connected in forming the 
causality. In other words, realist review is a method that attempts to qualitatively 
explain phenomena in detail. 
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7.1 Results 
As expected, the results of the studies in the literature review sample are not consistent. 
Many findings are different from each other depending on the context. However, PBC 
literature seems to be evolving recently. The quantity of PBC articles released is 
increasing while the topics are getting more and more diverse. As the understanding 
of the most fundamental topics, like the effectiveness of PBC and benefits of subjective 
evaluation, grows, there will be better opportunities for more complex topics like 
cultural and personal differences to evaluate the inconsistencies in the findings. 
H1a: Performance-based compensation is effective in increasing firm 
performance. 
PBC is found to be effective in increasing firm performance via increased employee 
performance and output quality. PBC motivates the employees to perform better as 
well as motivates the employees to learn how to do their work better. PBC can also 
encourage teamwork, increase goal congruence, and alleviate agency problem. These 
assumptions stand in most cases where the PBC system rewards the employee for 
doing the actions that increase firm performance, but in cases where employee intrinsic 
motivation is high, and employees are very committed to the firm the PBC is less 
effective in increasing performance. 
H1b: Performance measurements need to measure and reward the employee on 
the dimensions that reflect the firm strategy. 
If the firm measures and rewards on the dimensions that do not increase firm 
performance, the effect of PBC on firm performance can be zero, or even negative. 
The dimensions of measurement need to be carefully planned to avoid short-term 
focus, earnings management or misleading targets that result in suboptimal 
performance or gaming. Best measurements are those that cannot be manipulated and 
can be measured accurately, like targets based on directly measurable output or 
external performance targets. 
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H1c: Subjective performance measures are usually an effective complement to 
objective performance measures. 
Objectively measurable accurate outputs are rare in complex organizations. Subjective 
performance measures are considered a good complement to objective performance 
measures, especially when objective measures are noisy or subject to environmental 
shocks. Adding a subjective dimension to measurement also supports creativity and 
long-term focus better than only using objective measures. If the subjective evaluation 
is based on one manager’s review, the use of subjective evaluation risks favoritism and 
evaluation based on inappropriate criteria. To avoid bias and prejudice in subjective 
evaluation, peer-reviews are usually beneficial in supporting manager evaluation. 
Even in situations where peer-reviews are not very effective, like when team is very 
heterogenous and not aware of each other’s tasks, they are very rarely harmful to firm 
performance. 
H1d: The employees’ perception of fairness in their performance-based 
compensation increases firm performance. 
The employee’s perception of fairness increases firm performance, and perceived 
unfairness decreases firm performance. Perceiving the PBC as fair increases the 
employee’s organizational citizenship and motivation. PBC can be designed to be 
perceived as more fair by having technical validity, reflecting firm strategy with the 
targets, utilizing subjective performance measurement to complement objective 
measures and having an overall legitimate and fair compensation policy. 
H1e: Performance-based compensation has significant cultural differences in 
North America, Europe, and Asia. 
PBC has significant cultural differences in the bonus percentages, utilization of PBC, 
the level of sophistication in PBC systems and the perception of PBC. There is a very 
wide variety of variables affecting cultural differences, likely most of which are not 
mentioned in this thesis’ literature sample. This thesis finds that tax rates, differences 
in power distance and the level of cultural masculinity have an effect on PBC across 
different cultures. These differences might be not only caused by cultural differences 
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but individual differences between employees as well. For example, a more ambitious 
individual prefers a PBC contract while a less ambitious employee might opt out. 
H1f: Performance-based compensation schemes can be utilized to attract skilled 
employees. 
Individual differences can work as the strength of PBC, as a firm offering a PBC 
contract might be more attractive to ambitious and highly skilled individuals compared 
to firms not offering PBC contracts. PBC can also act as a support to retain skilled 
employees when the employees can meet the performance targets and feel rewarded 
of their work. Notably, when using penalty contracts the employee turnover increases 
compared to when using bonus contracts, indicating that penalties incur unwanted 
costs in human capital management. 
H1g: Penalties extract better performance than bonuses. 
Penalties extract better performance from employees than bonuses when employees 
consider the PBC as fair. But, penalty contracts increase risk-taking. Bonus contracts, 
on the contrary, are preferred by the employees and indicate trust to the employee. In 
some cases, presenting an option to choose between penalty and bonus contract has 
the same performance outcome for both bonus contract and penalty contract. When an 
employee has a choice, though, they tend to choose bonus contract over penalty 
contract if economically similar contracts are offered. In less common cases, ambitious 
employees prefer penalty contracts as they know they will work harder under penalty 
contract compared to bonus contract. Still, risk-averse firms should stick to bonus 
contracts as the safer option as penalty contracts increase risk-taking. Clawback 
contracts are beneficial in some situations where investments are high-risk, as the 
managers are more liable for the outcome of the investment. 
H1h: The more difficult the targets the better the performance. 
As per goal-setting theory, more difficult targets yield better performance – up to a 
certain point. Goal-setting theory also establishes that targets need to be difficult but 
achievable, which is supported by the realist review. Target ratcheting is found to be a 
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harmful practice to firm performance. To maintain the benefits of PBC, target 
ratcheting should be avoided, and targets should be adjusted downwards if they are not 
achieved. Ex-post adjustments of targets can be utilized to increase the perception of 
fairness and pay the employees bonuses despite not meeting the ex-ante defined 
targets. If the target difficulty is increased, the reward should be increased to maintain 
the performance increase. Additionally, setting long-term targets increases long-term 
performance. 
H1i: It is beneficial to involve employees in the planning process of a new 
performance-based compensation system. 
The collective learning and co-operative development of PBC system is beneficial, but 
employees are rarely aware what drives their performance. Involving employees in the 
development and implementation process of the PBC can clarify and communicate 
organizational goals. The implementation is a process that yields best results when the 
development is continued also after the initial release. The effects of PBC are usually 
not instantly observable, and it might take time before the PBC-induced performance 
increase can be observed. 
H1j: Performance feedback improves performance. 
Relative performance feedback increases performance when the employee is 
compensated based on individual performance but decreases performance if the 
employee performs worse than their peers. In some cases, performance feedback has 
no effect at all. In other words, the sample in this thesis does not yield a generalizable 
statement on performance feedback and it is difficult to state if performance feedback 
has a performance-increasing effect when coupled with PBC. 
H2: Realist review is an effective systematic literature review method for 
management accounting research. 
The realist review is useful in the qualitative evaluation of research, to summarize the 
findings for practical applications. In healthcare, a realist review is used to synthesize 
research of the same cause-effect relationship to evaluate whether the cause-effect 
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relationship is sufficiently significant to be applied to practice – for example, the 
efficiency of a method to apply certain treatment for a certain medical condition. In 
business, based on this thesis, it seems that the realist review method is an effective 
way to synthesize research findings. Realist review is the most useful when the topic 
has mostly case studies, as the power of the realist review’s qualitative synthesis is the 
most effective in those situations. The topic of this thesis was not the optimal use of 
realist review, however. The topic was too broad, as synthetizing information from 
this many separate topics with realist review yields rather general information instead 
of detailed descriptions of the mechanisms and contexts of the cause-effect 
relationship. Nonetheless, the purpose of the study was achieved as the synthesized 
information in a realist review can be useful for decision-making.  
In conclusion, the realist review seems to be an effective method for management 
accounting research, but the topic and literature sample need to be carefully defined 
beforehand. Namely, the optimal topic would be a single cause-effect relationship and 
the studies in the sample would be mainly case studies. 
7.2 Relevance and limitations 
This thesis contributes to management accounting research by providing the frontier 
of performance-based compensation research. The thesis is an extension to the 
normative research base of management accounting as the synthesis is created to 
support research-based decision-making when planning to implement a PBC system. 
Also, the thesis contributes to management accounting research by introducing a novel 
systematic literature review research method: the realist review. 
The sample in the study could pose limitations in how generalizable the statements 
are. Excluding executive and CEO compensation potentially dropped many important 
findings from the synthesis. Also, excluding earnings management literature could 
have resulted in lack of insight, especially since earnings management is a potential 
method for some managers to manipulate their bonuses. More importantly, the scope 
of the thesis is too wide. While systematically reviewing 10 different topics in a single 
literature review yielded useful synthesis for supporting decision-making, very few if 
any of the statements are detailed enough to be considered robust. The thesis should 
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have included only one of the topics to thoroughly explore. Nonetheless, the thesis 
collects the frontier of current research in PBC and forms a solid knowledge base to 
start exploring each of the topics in detail. 
Studies in the literature review are mainly conducted in Western countries, which 
limits the applicability internationally. Also, even Western countries differ 
significantly in their cultures. Since most of the studies were conducted in North 
America, the findings should be treated with caution in environments and cultures that 
are significantly different. Finally, the literature review method is subjective and as 
such subject to bias from the author. There is a risk that there was bias in the selection 
of articles, in the interpretation and in the synthesis. Optimally, the selection of articles 
and the findings should be validated by an external party to avoid bias and 
misinterpretation. 
7.3 Suggestions for further research 
In future research, all the hypotheses in this study could be researched separately, each 
in their own systematic literature review. To truly contribute to management 
accounting and PBC research, each of the elements should be carefully examined in 
much more detail. 
Most notably, the cultural differences are a significant element of PBC to examine. 
Many large firms opt to implement a firm-wide compensation plan regardless of 
cultural and regional differences. Jansen et al. (2009) argue that global best practices 
yield suboptimal results due to significant differences in national environments. Coram 
and Robinson (2017) show that the partner compensation in accounting firms is higher 
in Australia than in Sweden, concluding that the Swedish welfare model affects the 
remuneration. In Germany, the bonus percentage is usually only from 4% to 8% 
(Unger et al., 2020) which is significantly lower than in North America. In this thesis 
the studies that explicitly mention bonus percentages show that the North American 
bonus percentage is between 0%-165% of the fixed salary, while the highest European 
bonus percentage in this sample was 32%. Malmi et al. (2020) point out that while the 
research for cultural differences in management control is still in its early stages, the 
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cross-cultural variation could provide explanations for the inconsistencies in prior 
literature. 
In the sample were very few articles regarding stock options as white-collar employee 
compensation, as only Chen (2003) explicitly studies employee stock options in 
compensation. This is a surprising finding, as one of the most prominent questions 
from entrepreneurs is whether they should use stock options in employee 
compensation plans. Some firms, like the IT Consulting firm Reaktor, prides 
themselves in that the firm is solely owned by its employees and that majority of 
employees have an ownership stake (Valtonen, 2016). There seems to be an 
opportunity for research in the usage of stock options in PBC for white-collar 
employees instead of only executives and CEOs. 
This thesis does not explore task complexity as a motivating factor despite Bonner and 
Sprinkle (2002) presenting the factor as important, because there were no studies in 
the sample that contained significant findings regarding task complexity as a variable 
in performance-based compensation. White-collar employees operate in widely 
varying tasks depending on their position, which generates the question if the 
effectiveness of incentives depends on job-related attributes (Ikäheimo, Kallunki, 
Moilanen, & Schiehll, 2018). Ikäheimo et al. (2018) find that there is a significant 
positive association between performance-based incentives for white-collar employees 
and the firm future performance measured as increase in return on assets. In addition 
to task complexity, the organizational level of measurement matters. Kauhanen and 
Piekkola (2006) conclude that the closer the measured item is to the employee, the 
better is the motivating effect. In other words, if the measurement is done on firm level, 
and the employee is on a very low-level and has seemingly low effect on the outcome, 
the incentive system is not likely motivating. These could be explored also in a 
systematic literature review to define if task complexity and measurement level are 
significant factors in PBC. 
Finally, the realist review method could be utilized more in management accounting 
research. It seems that the prescriptive nature of realist review could work very well 
with topics that are clearly defined and contain a lot of case studies and interventionist 
studies. Based on this thesis, the usefulness is not restricted only to the health care 
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sector, especially since interventionist studies are a valid and common method in 
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APPENDIX 3: Realist review 
1 PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION EFFECTIVENESS 
Statement 1A 
PBC (C) increases firm performance (O), namely employee performance (O) 
and output quality (O) because PBC increases motivation to perform better 
(M), and motivates employees to learn how to perform better (M). PBC also 
reduces over-optimism (M), increases teamwork (M), and increases goal 
congruence (M). The positive outcome is observed in at least the following cases: 
Work is complex (C), employees have not explicitly voiced a preference for 
money bonuses (C), and PBC is rewarded on dimensions that increase firm 
performance (C). 
“Our first result was that switching to PPBC (Partially performance-based 
compensation) led to a highly significant (1% level of significance) increase in the 
productivity of employees measured by the average number of typed pages per 
workday of 9,53%. . . . We find that the observed productivity gains do not merely 
persist but rather seem to grow over the time an employee is on PPBC, although with 
a decreasing slope. The employees in our sample seemed to find ways of working faster 
and/or more efficiently once they were exposed to financial incentives based on their 
output. These productivity gains seemed to be largest following the months after the 
initial switch to PPBC.” (Unger, Szczesny, & Holderried, 2020) 
“[M]anagers and their superiors are likely to form different expectations about the 
extent and, potentially more importantly, the direction of planned effort by managers. 
. . . the incentive system moderated self-enhancement tendencies on the total planned 
hours of managerial effort made by managers (subordinate/employee in this context).” 
(Cianci, Kaplan, & Samuels, 2013) 
“If the employer wishes the employee to learn certain aspects of the job, attaching 
bonuses to those aspects not only motivates the employee to exert effort in learning, it 
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also reduces the effort required by making knowledge acquisition more automatic.” 
(Luft, 1994) 
“We find that the implementation of the plan is associated with increases in sales that 
persist and increase over time. As such this finding supports the basic agency-theoretic 
assumption that output increases when agents are rewarded for performance. . . . 
These observations are consistent with the permanent sales consultants (but not the 
temporary workers) optimally assessing the multi-period implications of working to 
develop long-term service relation with customers, or to learn how to perform their 
task more efficiently, which translates into future sales gain.” (Banker, Lee & Potter, 
1996) 
“Moreover, the plan motivates the employees remaining with the firm to continually 
improve their productivity, which suggests that pay-for-performance provides 
incentives to invest in effort that has long-term performance effects.” (Banker, Lee, 
Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000a) 
“Finally, bonus contracts tended to be used in settings where the profit (or surplus) of 
the hospital was substantially affected by administrator effort (i.e., hospitals with a 
more complex set of service offerings).” (Lambert & Larcker, 1995) 
“I find that being in the monetary incentives condition (i.e.,being eligible to win a cash 
bonus) leads to an increase in performance only for those who state a low preference 
for this incentive.” (Lourenço, 2020) 
“[O]ur results indicate that as long as they understand the EVA concept managers on 
EVA bonus plans outperform managers on traditional bonus plans. . . . increases in 
performance arise because of increased consistency in the evaluation–reward process 
rather than from superiority of EVA as a performance measure. Also, we find that the 
effect of EVA bonuses and understanding can differ dramatically for different parts of 
the firm which suggests that EVA may not be universally appropriate.”(Riceman, 
Cahan, & Lal, 2002) 
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“I find significant improvements in worker productivity and product quality as well as 
reductions in worker absenteeism and turnover after the implementation of the 
incentive plan. These findings underscores an important point that has not been 
emphasized in existing empirical studies of incentive pay for teams: the need to 
introduce management control and organizational changes in tandem with incentive 
pay to capture greater incentive effects from workers.”(Román, 2009) 
“Although the higher spread [of equity compensation] was seen as a recruitment tool 
and a way to motivate partners to improve their performance, firms remained 
conscious of the need to carefully manage the spread as it could lead to discontent 
within the partner cohort and have considerable implications for the firm’s values.” 
(Coram & Robinson, 2017) 
“[P]iece-rate incentives lead to higher productivity than fixed pay incentives in the 
absence of a value statement, but the presence of an organizational value statement 
moderates the productivity effects of the alternative compensation incentive schemes.” 
(Akinyele, Arnold, & Sutton, 2020) 
“Our analysis also documented that nonfinancial performance improves following the 
implementation of the incentive plan that included nonfinancial measures. Financial 
performance as measured by operating profit also improves both in terms of long-term 
increases in revenues associated with current improvement in customer satisfaction 
and reduction in operating costs.” (Banker, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000b) 
Statement 1B 
PBC (C) is less effective (O) when it makes organizational structures too 
inflexible (M) and when intrinsic motivation is high (C), or employees are 
committed to firm values (C) because employees are motivated by other things 
than monetary bonuses (M). The ineffectiveness can also be observed when 
employees are not committed to the firm in the long term (C). Additionally, 
strong monitoring (C) reduces the effectiveness of PBC (O), because of 
employees perceiving the monitoring negatively (M). Also, if PBC dimensions do 
not match with desired output (C) the performance is hindered (O) due to 
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discouraged effort towards voluntary work (M) and increased misreporting 
(M). 
“While we could not detect a positive effect on profits from the use of incentive 
compensation in the US firms, we did find a positive effect on pay satisfaction in those 
firms. In the Dutch firms, though, the effects of the use of incentive compensation on 
both net profit and pay satisfaction were negative. This finding suggests that provision 
of incentives should not be considered part of a set of ‘‘global best practices.”” 
(Jansen, Merchant, & Van der Stede, 2009) 
“The bonus had little impact on the primacy of intrinsic rewards, on the creation of 
tensions, and on the organisation’s culture. . . . Our analysis has indicated that the 
motivational effect of extrinsic rewards – taken as being important in the business 
sector – is greatly-reduced in the NFP (not-for-profit) sector. NFP staff appear to be 
motivated along the lines of stewardship theory.” (Kluvers & Tippett, 2011) 
“As predicted, there is a significant increase in the moderation effect on incentive 
schemes (fixed pay versus piece-rate) when the value statement is made more salient, 
such that productivity is further enhanced under a fixed pay scheme although 
productivity is not significantly affected under the piece-rate incentive scheme. This 
provides a positive outcome as it implies that the significant moderation effect of a 
more salient general value statement is due to improvement in fixed pay productivity.” 
(Akinyele, Arnold, & Sutton, 2020) 
“There is also strong evidence that the impact of the incentive contract is lower when 
the proportion of temporary workers is higher. These observations are consistent with 
the permanent sales consultants (but not the temporary workers) optimally assessing 
the multi-period implications of working to develop longterm service relation with 
customers, or to learn how to perform their task more efficiently, which translates into 
future sales gain.” (Banker, Lee, & Potter, 1996) 
“More precisely, the motivational effect of RPI [Relative Performance Information, 
which can be considered very similar to PBC in this particular study] diminishes, the 
more the working environment undermines individuals’ perceived autonomy, and the 
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more intrusive individuals perceive controls to be.” (Schedlinsky, Schmidt, & 
Wöhrmann, 2020) 
“When we examine the association between profit-based compensation and charity 
care levels, we find a negative association within for-profits and no association within 
nonprofits.” (Eldenburg, Gaertner, & Goodman, 2015) 
“Preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to a greater increase in forecast optimism 
(compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the presence of performance-based 
incentives than in the absence of performance-based incentives.” (Chen, C. X., 
Rennekamp, & Zhou, 2015) 
“Using a capital budgeting setting, we show that a principal’s choice of an incentive 
contract over a fixed-salary contract can suggest that other agents are likely to report 
high costs, revealing crucial information about social norms in the setting. This 
information changes the agents’ norm perception and increases their level of 
misreporting.” (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015) 
“The study also illustrates, however, that the new incentive system and its 
complements made a trade-off with broader organizational concerns such as flexibility 
(job rotation) and cultural norms of equity. These trade-offs had a significant impact 
on the perceived success of incentive pay in the camshaft cell, eventually leading to 
the termination of the new incentive system.” (Friis, Hansen, & Vámosi, 2015) 
“[W]e find that EPS dilution significantly affects financing choice when executives are 
explicitly compensated on EPS performance. . . . We also report evidence that using 
EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts and the resulting managerial 
fixation on reported EPS alleviate underleveraging, as indicated by firms’ speed of 
adjustment to target leverage ratios and debt conservatism levels.” (Huang, 
Marquardt, & Zhang, 2014) 
“[I]ncreased reward potentials might tempt managers to maximize their current-
period bonus in destructive ways-by making short-term decisions or by managing 
earnings-even though senior and middle-level Fiat managers are, with rare 
115 
exceptions, long-term employees with a high level of loyalty to the 
company.”(Merchant & Riccaboni, 1990) 
2 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Statement 2A 
When performance measurement is possible to do more accurately (C), and the 
weight on PBC can be increased (C) the performance is increased (O), due to 
reduced compression bias (M). Accurate external performance standards (C) 
also mitigate gaming issues (O) as external targets cannot be manipulated (M). 
“We find greater weight on performance-based compensation when less revenue is 
received through capitation payments, physicians are more experienced, the practice 
is larger, and a professional management company performs administrative functions 
for the practice. Conversely, performance-based compensation receives less weight 
when physicians perform activities that are not well captured in standard clinical 
productivity measures or when more physicians in the group practice the same 
specialty, increasing mutual monitoring ability.” (Ittner, Larcker, & Pizzini, 2007) 
“[A]rguments for applying piece rates are particularly well-reasoned and persuasive 
if “output is easily measured, quality problems are readily detected, and blame is 
assignable”. The output (and input) of typing dictations can easily be measured. 
Furthermore, typing dictations is a task that is very closely controlled by concerned 
physicians and senior physicians; consequently, potential quality problems can 
purposefully be identified, and blame is easily assignable.” (Unger, Szczesny, & 
Holderried, 2020) 
“[W]e find that (1) agent performance improvement is positively associated with 
degree of discriminability, (2) subjective measures are inferior to objective measures 
in providing incentive to the agent because of lack of discriminability, and (3) such 
inferiority of subjective measures is exacerbated in a situation where the 
discriminability gap between objective and subjective measures is greater.” (Ahn, 
Hwang, & Kim, 2010) 
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“Many recent innovations in organizational structures and incentive design mitigate 
potential problems with internal standards by effectively “externalizing” the 
performance standard; that is, by basing standards on objective measures beyond the 
direct control of managers.” (Murphy, 2000) 
Statement 2B 
Suboptimal dimensions of measurement (C) risk poor performance (O) because 
of short-term focus (M), earnings management (M), or misleading targets (M).  
“[W]e find that EPS dilution significantly affects financing choice when executives are 
explicitly compensated on EPS performance. We also find that clientele effects related 
to transient institutional ownership levels contribute to the phenomenon, but our 
results linking investor sentiment to an avoidance of EPS dilution were sensitive to 
several research design choices.” (Huang, Marquardt, & Zhang, 2014) 
“[I]ncreased reward potentials might tempt managers to maximize their current-
period bonus in destructive ways-by making short-term decisions or by managing 
earnings-even though senior and middle-level Fiat managers are, with rare 
exceptions, long-term employees with a high level of loyalty to the company.” 
(Merchant & Riccaboni, 1990) 
3 SUBJECTIVE MEASURES 
Statement 3A 
Subjective PBC (C) is effective in supporting objective PBC (O) when objective 
measures fail to encourage cooperation (M) or long-term focus (M), and when 
objective performance is noisy (M). Also, effectiveness is elevated when the 
strategic business unit is young (C), creativity is required (C), and in the case of 
team-based PBC, the team tasks are not interdependent of each other (C). 
“[W]e find evidence that subjective bonuses are used to mitigate perceived weaknesses 
in bonus awards based on quantitative performance measures, such as in situations 
where formula bonuses fail to adequately encourage investments with long-term 
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impacts, such as in training and where formula bonuses fail to encourage cooperation 
or where performance is noisy due to the influence of other departments.” (Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004) 
“Supervisors raise current, unexpectedly low performance so that it is consistent with 
prior performance when they perceive the measure of that performance is incomplete 
and noisy, consistent with their mandate of improving objective measurement.” 
(Woods, 2012) 
“That is, the effect on incentive compensation of unusually high (low) performance 
that may be due to good (bad) luck can be filtered out with a lower (higher) subjective 
performance assessments. This study considers an additional use of ex post 
subjectivity in providing for parity in risk-adjusted compensation under ‘one-size-fits-
all’ (OSFA) incentive contracts commonly used for non-executive managers.” 
(Anderson, Dekker, Sedatole, & Wiersma, 2020) 
“The findings also show an association between subjective bonus this period and 
performance improvements next period. This association is consistent with these 
bonuses having a long-term effect on employee commitment.” (Aranda, Arellano, & 
Davila, 2019) 
“Focusing on the use of non-financial performance measures, we predict and find that 
the demand for discretion increases as measurability decreases. Furthermore, 
congruity amplifies the rate of increase in the demand for discretion.” (Huang, 
Balakrishnan, & Pan, 2021) 
“ [G]reater reliance on long-run criteria as well as greater reliance on subjective 
(nonformula) approaches for determining the SBU general managers' bonus 
contributes to effectiveness in the case of build SBUs but hampers it in the case of 
harvest SBUs” (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985) 
“Combining PBP (performance-based pay, implies objective measures) with SPE 
(subjective performance evaluation) allows creative firms to direct their employees’ 
attention to overall company goals without paying the cost associated with the 
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dysfunctional effects of PBP for creative behavior. This complementarity also implies 
that the use of PBP is conditional on the use of SPE.” (Grabner, 2014) 
“[W]e find that discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team output 
relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent and a negative 
effect when task interdependence is present. The results arise because, as managers 
do not fully ignore inefficient effort that does not contribute to team output, they are 
less successful in using discretion to link employees’ bonuses to team output 
contributions when task interdependence is present.” (Arnold & Tafkov, 2019) 
Statement 3B 
The use of nonfinancial and HR measures (C), especially in situations with 
strong interdependence between business units (C), is beneficial (O) when pay 
structure is hierarchical and the human capital has strong emphasis (M) when 
nonfinancial measures can reduce the noise of accounting measures (M) and 
because of metrics with long-term emphasis like customer satisfaction (M). 
“Taken together, the results show that labor-intensive firms that employ a hierarchical 
pay structure are more likely to use both non-financial and human resource measures 
than they are to rely solely on traditional financial measures.”(Widener, 2006) 
“In the presence of interdependencies, such as joint demand or production functions, 
ensuring cooperation among business unit managers is not a straightforward task. We 
find that firms do not reduce their use of accounting return measures in an effort to 
encourage cooperation but instead add weight to disaggregated measures such as 
expenses and revenues, and nonfinancial measures, which are less susceptible to the 
effects of these interdependencies. . . . Our theory suggests that nonfinancial measures 
are used in response to increasing interdependencies because they are able to reduce 
the noise in accounting measures.” (Bouwens & Van Lent, 2007) 
“Our analysis also documented that nonfinancial performance improves following the 
implementation of the incentive plan that included nonfinancial measures. Financial 
performance as measured by operating profit also improves both in terms of long-term 
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increases in revenues associated with current improvement in customer satisfaction 
and reduction in operating costs.” (Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000a) 
Statement 3C 
Subjectivity can be used (C) to counter environmental heterogeneity (O) in 
commonly used firm-wide PBC contracts (M) because environmental 
uncertainty makes the PBC effect more muted (M). 
“We interpret our results as evidence that supervisors use discretion in setting 
subjective ratings to mitigate heterogeneity in the compensation risk imposed on 
managers by the OSFA [One size fits all] compensation contract. Subjectivity thus 
provides not only the means to reward hard-to-measure dimensions of performance 
and to adjust compensation ex post based on post-contractual information, but also 
the ability to deliver differential risk premiums to managers thereby achieving greater 
parity in risk-adjusted compensation among managers with similar jobs.” (Anderson, 
Dekker, Sedatole, & Wiersma, 2020) 
“Discretion is used at the beginning of the period when setting targets and at the end 
of the period, when deciding on subjective bonuses. This association allows managers 
to customize targets to the personal characteristics of employees and their units. This 
customization gives managers the possibility of setting targets closer to the optimal 
level from a goal setting theory perspective rather than being limited to the 
alternatives available in formula-based contracts.” (Aranda, Arellano, & Davila, 
2019) 
“Our findings support Prendergast’s [2011] argument that this tradeoff relates to 
contracting difficulty; that is, as noise created by external volatility increases, there is 
a relatively greater preference for employee selection. That is not to say that incentive 
contracting will not be used as it continues to play an important role by providing 
motivation and reinforcing selection processes, but it becomes more “muted” when 
contracting on output becomes increasingly difficult” (Abernethy, Dekker, & Schulz, 
2015) 
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“Overall, the findings show that corporate-level effects predominantly drive 
variations in MCISs, which suggests that MCISs tend to be uniformly implemented 
within firms, rather than to reflect local business-unit conditions.” (Van der Stede, 
2003) 
Statement 3D 
Peer-review-based PBC (C) increases performance (O), because of the higher 
accuracy of compensation in a team setting (M) and limited risk of bias in peer-
review quality (M) especially when teams are homogenous (M). Peer-reviewing 
also promotes knowledge sharing (M). Peer-review is also effective (O) when 
cooperation and knowledge sharing among team members is beneficial for the 
member (M), especially when the team members are team-oriented instead of 
individually oriented (C).  
“Consistent with our predictions, we find that TSC (team member subjective 
communication) increases team performance, but that the positive effect of TSC is 
more muted for heterogeneous teams.” (Arnold, Hannan, & Tafkov, 2018) 
“[W]hen workers had both increased cost driver information [Activity-Based Costing 
instead of Volume-Based Costing] and higher incentives to cooperate [Group 
Incentives instead of Tournament Incentives], they initiated more cooperative 
innovations, had lower production costs and higher profits than any other examined 
combination of cost system and incentive structure.” (Drake, Haka, & Ravenscroft, 
1999) 
“[R]esults suggest that participants express a greater willingness to help a new 
colleague when it involves knowledge sharing than when it does not, but only when 
the helpee can influence the implicit reward. Moreover, we find that helpees provide 
higher rewards for help involving knowledge sharing than help that does not .. . . By 
examining the role knowledge sharing plays in enhancing implicit, trust-based 
incentives, our results contribute to a better understanding of observations from 
practice. In particular, we observe organizations who particularly value knowledge 
sharing tie bonuses to the subjective, ex post evaluations of work-team colleagues” 
(Haesebrouck, Van den Abbeele, & Williamson, 2021) 
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“We find no difference in group performance depending on incentive structure for 
assembly lines; however, group performance is higher under group incentives for 
teams. Supplemental analysis indicates group incentives support the teams’ ability to 
implement beneficial task strategies and although mixed incentives are theoretically 
appealing, they may send confusing signals to employees about where to direct their 
effort.” (Kuang & Moser, 2011) 
“The results indicate that significantly more knowledge is shared under group 
incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, 
whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across incentive regimes for 
equal-status groups. Thus, although individual incentives can motivate knowledge 
sharing among equal-status groups, they cannot overcome the negative effects that 
arise with status differences. Instead, group incentives can mitigate the negative effects 
of status differences on knowledge sharing.” (Haesebrouck, Cools, & Van Den 
Abbeele, 2018) 
“[W]hen plants use output performance measures, they are more likely to sue 
exclusively group-based (as opposed to individual-based) output measures when the 
value of knowledge sharing is greater and when, production workers possess less 
specific knowledge.” (Hwang, Erkens, & Evans III, 2009) 
“Organizations with collectivist individuals appear to demand group-based incentives 
rather than individual incentives. It seems that the trend of using teamwork should be 
accompanied by an appropriate team design, distinguishing between group task 
designs and carefully considering how to reward the performance of the team 
(individual versus group incentives).”(Naranjo-Gil, Cuevas-Rodríguez, López-
Cabrales, & Sánchez, 2012) 
“We rely on goal interdependence theory to predict that when group members can 
provide useful information about how to perform the task better (i.e., in a team 
production environment), group incentives will motivate group members to interact, 
share information and learn from each other, resulting in higher group perfroamcen 
than under individual or mixed incentives. Our results support this prediction.” (Libby 
& Thorne, 2009) 
122 
Statement 3E 
With a heterogenous team, (C) team-based PBC is less effective (O) with both 
subjective manager evaluation (C) and peer-review evaluation (C) because the 
inability to accurately review peers causes performance-reward mismatch (M), 
and discretion in manager evaluation reduces team cohesion and discourages 
helping (M). 
“These divergent fairness reference points result in more divergent information 
provided to the manager. The increased divergence causes the manager to deviate 
more from the individual team member’s TSC (team member subjective 
communication) when determining bonus allocations. As a result of these two effects, 
the relation between individual contributions and rewards is weakened in 
heterogeneous teams, resulting in lower contributions to team output.” (Arnold, 
Hannan, & Tafkov, 2018) 
“[W]e find that discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team output 
relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent and a negative 
effect when task interdependence is present. The results arise because, as managers 
do not fully ignore inefficient effort that does not contribute to team output, they are 
less successful in using discretion to link employees’ bonuses to team output 
contributions when task interdependence is present. Additionally, managerial 
discretion reduces team cohesion, thereby hurting coordination and helping, which is 
problematic under task interdependence, where coordination and helping are 
important for achieving high team performance.” (Arnold & Tafkov, 2019) 
Statement 3F 
Subjective performance measures (C) induce uncertainty and perceptions of 
favoritism in evaluation (O) when subjectivity allows the managers to evaluate 
based on inappropriate criteria (C) and change the criteria rapidly (C) because 
subjective measures are susceptible to manager’s prejudice and bias (M). 
Namely, managers tend to mediate extreme reviews (M), punish good 
performers less than bad performers (M) and at worst, poorly evaluate 
employees they wish to push out of the organization (M). 
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“We find that the use of subjectivity in weighting the measures in a balanced scorecard 
bonus plan allowed supervisors to ignore many performance measures, with financial 
performance became the primary determinant of bonuses. In addition, the subjectivity 
in the balanced scorecard plan allowed area directors to incorporate factors other 
than the scorecard measures in performance evaluations, to change evaluation 
criteria from quarter to quarter, to ignore measures that were predictive of future 
financial performance and to weight measures that were not predictive of desired 
results.” (Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003) 
“We find that the use of subjectivity in weighting the measures in a balanced scorecard 
bonus plan allowed supervisors to ignore many performance measures, with financial 
performance became the primary determinant of bonuses. In addition, the subjectivity 
in the balanced scorecard plan allowed area directors to incorporate factors other 
than the scorecard measures in performance evaluations, to change evaluation 
criteria from quarter to quarter, to ignore measures that were predictive of future 
financial performance and to weight measures that were not predictive of desired 
results.” (Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003) 
“Overall, the results of this study indicate that accounting practices related to 
performance evaluation may be influenced by implicit attitudes that yield some degree 
of racial bias in decisions.” (Upton & Arrington, 2012) 
“Our study provides evidence that experienced auditors with higher tacit knowledge 
are better supervisors. Supervisors with higher tacit knowledge may well be less likely 
to provide inadequate supervision of subordinates and other team members. . . . Our 
theory and results collectively suggest that supervisor-specific attributes not only 
influence how well supervisors evaluate, but also what factors they value and reward.” 
(Bol, Estep, Moers, & Peecher, 2018) 
“[W]e find that the participants’ bonus reduction is lower (higher) when the 
employee’s objective performance is higher (lower). We show that an employee’s good 
objective performance serves as a halo for the manager’s perception of the employee’s 
morality and affects the ex-post subjective bonus adjustment.” (Maske, Sohn, & 
Hirsch, 2021) 
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“[W]e find that (1) agent performance improvement is positively associated with 
degree of discriminability, (2) subjective measures are inferior to objective measures 
in providing incentive to the agent because of lack of discriminability, and (3) such 
inferiority of subjective measures is exacerbated in a situation where the 
discriminability gap between objective and subjective measures is greater.” (Ahn, 
Hwang, & Kim, 2010) 
“Evidence documents that supervisors make downward adjustments to encourage 
some employees to leave the organization, and avoid downward adjustments to 
preclude negative consequences for managers and themselves.” (Woods, 2012) 
Statement 3G 
Giving managers discretionary power over distributing bonuses (C) does not 
make bonus payments more accurate (O) due to anchoring heuristic (M) and 
reluctance to make downward adjustments (M), and manager tendency to battle 
unfairness more than promote fairness even if it incurs extra costs in evaluation 
(M). Especially during shocks (C) managers are reluctant to make changes to 
avoid upsetting the employees (M).  
“[W]e find that managers generally use a piecemeal approach when allocating 
discretionary bonus pools, which gives rise to the anchoring heuristic. That is, when 
processing performance information, managers tend to choose a starting point and 
then qualitatively adjust from this starting point for noncontractible information. . . . 
Importantly, we find that managers who use an anchoring approach incorporate 
noncontractible information into bonus pool allocations to a lesser degree than those 
who use an integrative approach.” (Bailey, Hecht, & Towry, 2011) 
“We find greater consideration of noncontractible information under partial 
discretion than under full discretion. Thus, our results imply that limiting discretion 
can facilitate managers’ incorporation of relevant noncontractible information into 
bonus allocations.” (Bailey, Hecht, & Towry, 2011) 
“We argue that managers consider event likelihood when considering whether and to 
what extent they make discretionary adjustments, but that the implications of this 
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consideration are muted in scenarios characterized by higher employee bonus 
interdependence. Via an experiment, we find support for our predictions. Our results 
suggest that the effect of event likelihood on managers’ use of discretion is explained 
by managers’ consideration of the precedent that an adjustment in the current period 
sets for future periods, and the type of motivation (i.e., conventional versus adaptive) 
that an adjustment induces. Further, we find that the effect of bonus interdependence 
on managers’ use of discretion is explained by managers’ consideration of the 
demotivating influence of such adjustments on the manager not affected by the event.” 
(Bol, Hecht, & Smith, 2015) 
“Specifically, we find that managers are less likely to make discretionary adjustments 
in scenarios in which firms are more likely to endow managers with such discretion—
namely, scenarios in which employees are more susceptible to compensation risk (i.e., 
when the likelihood of negative uncontrollable events is high). . . . Notably, we find 
that managers are unwilling to make adjustments to restore equity for one subordinate 
in highly interdependent situations in which another unaffected subordinate would be 
negatively and directly impacted.” (Bol, Hecht, & Smith, 2015) 
“Our study shows that even in the absence of such monetary incentives, social 
preferences can motivate managers to obtain additional costly information in order to 
evaluate and reward their employees according to their efforts. . . . However, this 
willingness is influenced by the outcome of aggregate performance. Specifically, this 
willingness increases as aggregate performance becomes less extreme and (given a 
specific level of extremeness) as aggregate performance increases. . . . The findings 
furthermore show that paying for fairness is not a dichotomous choice, as willingness 
to pay increases with the potential unfairness of the situation.” (Maas, Van Rinsum, 
& Towry, 2012) 
“New performance measures required new reporting procedures. For certain 
measures, reporting responsibility was assigned to functional and business unit 
managers. The reason for not automating this procedure, nor to pass the responsibility 
to controllers, was that an objective was making responsible managers verify the data 
and, most importantly, to increase these managers’ awareness of how certain 
126 
measures were originated and how they could initiate actions to improve results.” 
(Tuomela, 2005) 
“Supervisors raise current, unexpectedly low performance so that it is consistent with 
prior performance when they perceive the measure of that performance is incomplete 
and noisy, consistent with their mandate of improving objective measurement. 
Supervisors also raise current, unexpectedly low performance so that itis consistent 
with prior performance for other reasons, and even apparently holistically (at the 
manager level). Evidence documents that supervisors make downward adjustments to 
encourage some employees to leave the organization, and avoid downward 
adjustments to preclude negative consequences for managers and themselves.” 
(Woods, 2012)  
4 FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS 
Statement 4A 
The fairer the employee perceives the PBC (C), the better the organizational 
performance (O) because organizational citizenship behavior increases (M) and 
motivation increases (M), and vice versa if the PBC is perceived as unfair (C) it 
hinders performance (O). 
“[H]igher perceptions of procedural justice are associated with better employee 
performance through organizational citizenship behavior.” (Burney, Henle, & 
Widener, 2009) 
“[H]aving to pay a penalty for not achieving an uncertain target is perceived as 
unfair, and employees may be less motivated to work under such an incentive 
arrangement.” (Liu & Zhang, 2015) 
“[W]e show that pay dispersion has a reinforcing effect on the incentive-performance 
link when it is more likely to be considered legitimate, while it decreases the incentive 
effects when it is likely considered as unfair. . . . our results suggest employees are 
largely aware of the pay of others and use social comparison in their effort provision 
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decisions. This suggests that pay transparency, at least as measured by the disclosure 
of pay levels, exists without a formal policy. Our results highlight the importance of 
the perceived legitimacy of observed pay dispersion in the effort provision 
decision.”(Grabner & Martin, 2021) 
“If the level of payment is unfair, neither a bonus nor a penalty seems to matter. If 
individuals see that they earn less than their peers, they perceive it as a loss.” (Oblak, 
Ličen, & Slapničar, 2018) 
Statement 4B 
Employees perceive PBC as fairer (O) when PBC has increased technical 
validity (C), reflects the firm strategy (C), by offering signing bonus (C), 
utilizing subjective performance measures (C), or by offering choice in bonus 
contract type (bonus/penalty) (C) and the firm has an otherwise legitimate and 
fair compensation policy (C), because the firm signals trust (M). 
“[P]erceptions of two characteristics of an SPMS (Strategic Performance 
Management System) incentive plan — its degree of technical validity and the extent 
it reflects a strategic causal model — are associated with higher perceptions of both 
distributive and procedural justice.” (Burney, Henle, & Widener, 2009) 
“[S]igning bonus offers positively affect effort to a greater extent when there is an 
excess supply of labor than when there is an excess demand for labor. I also find that 
the impact of signing bonus offers on effort operates through workers’ beliefs about 
the employer’s trust in them.” (Choi, 2014) 
“[W]e show that pay dispersion has a reinforcing effect on the incentive-performance 
link when it is more likely to be considered legitimate, while it decreases the incentive 
effects when it is likely considered as unfair. . . . our results suggest employees are 
largely aware of the pay of others and use social comparison in their effort provision 
decisions. This suggests that pay transparency, at least as measured by the disclosure 
of pay levels, exists without a formal policy. Our results highlight the importance of 
the perceived legitimacy of observed pay dispersion in the effort provision 
decision.”(Grabner & Martin, 2021) 
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“[T]he effect of distributive justice outweighs the effect of procedural justice on 
intrinsic motivation. In other words, people care more about how fair their pay is 
compared to others than how their pay is determined.” (Oblak, Ličen, & Slapničar, 
2018) 
“In support of the idea that subjectivity aids contracting with the manager when trust 
is higher, we find that subjective bonuses are positively associated with pay 
satisfaction and performance when the manager has longer tenure at the dealership.” 
(Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004) 
“Regarding the ex ante design characteristics, we find a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped 
relationship between subjectivity emphasis and perceptions of distributive and 
procedural fairness, consistent with the notion that the use of subjective measures 
involves trade-offs that can differ depending on the emphasis on subjectivity.” 
(Voußem, Kramer, & Schäffer, 2016) 
“Our study provides evidence that it might be better for employers to let workers know 
that they are intentionally offering different types of contracts, and allowing workers 
to self-select into either a bonus or penalty contract to achieve the benefits of workers 
having a choice of contracts without experiencing the costs that could result from 
forcing them to work under a specific contract type.” (Gonzalez, Hoffman, & Moser, 
2020) 
5 PERSONAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
Statement 5A 
Individuals (C) tend to prefer contracts with PBC (O) when they are more 
skilled, prefer more risk, look for achievements and blame themselves less for 
shortcomings (M). 
“We find that individual’s skill, risk preferences, need for achievement and locus of 
control is each significantly associated with selecting a contract with performance 
incentives.” (Fehrenbacher, Kaplan, & Pedell, 2017) 
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“Our results regarding performance feedback suggest that individuals’ preferences 
for relative-performance-based pay when working on easy tasks versus difficult tasks 
is robust to the provision of individual performance feedback. However, we find some 
evidence that providing relative feedback on difficult tasks induces higher-skilled 
individuals to appropriately choose relative performance-based pay more often.” 
(Brown, Farrington, & Sprinkle, 2016) 
Statement 5B 
Involving the employee in the negotiation of PBC metrics and targets (C) does 
not yield good results (O), because employees do not necessarily know what 
drives their work performance (M), they might sandbag the budgeting process 
(M) and they generally choose PBC system that appears less risky even if it is 
less valuable (M). 
“We find that, while employee effort and firm profit are lower with negotiation than 
without negotiation under the output-based contract, they do not differ significantly 
with versus without negotiation under the fixed-wage contract.” (Kuang & Moser, 
2011) 
“I find that being in the monetary incentives condition (i.e.,being eligible to win a cash 
bonus) leads to an increase in performance only for those who state a low preference 
for this incentive.” (Lourenço, 2020) 
“[S]elf-reported motivators do not necessarily lead to a higher performance, i.e., 
preferences for and performance with different work incentives may be inconsistent. 
Therefore, designing incentive schemes based solely on self-reported ex-ante 
preferences may not always lead to ex-post improvement in work performance.” 
(Lourenço, 2020) 
“We find that participants exhibit a strong better-than average bias in assessing their 
skills on easy tasks. Conversely, we find that participants exhibit a moderate worse-
than-average bias in assessing their skills on difficult tasks. In turn, these biases guide 
contract choices, which leads to one of our key findings that participants are more 
likely to inappropriately select relative performance-based pay than fixed pay when a 
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task is easy versus when a task is difficult. Our results suggest that when choosing 
between fixed pay and performance-based pay that pays a bonus for above-average 
performance, the quality of individuals’ compensation plan decisions is worse when 
working on an easy task than when working on a difficult task.” (Brown, Farrington, 
& Sprinkle, 2016) 
“There is also ample evidence that basing standards on company budgets creates 
unproductive incentives to “sand-bag” the budgeting process. . . . Tying managerial 
bonuses to meeting the budget not only creates incentives to avoid current actions that 
affect future budgets, but also to provide biased and misleading information during 
the budget negotiation process.” (Murphy, 2000) 
“Finally, results indicate that when the two clawback contracts are compared, 
participants find the contract frame with the higher base salary to be more attractive. 
This is a somewhat unexpected result, because these two frames both provide an equal 
initial amount of pay that is not contingent upon a subsequent outcome. The only 
difference between the contracts is in the labeling of the portion of this amount called 
the ‘‘base salary’’ and the portion called a ‘‘bonus.’’ This very subtle manipulation 
has a significant impact on participant reactions. This provides evidence that the 
verbal labeling of the components of these contracts can have a strong effect on 
behavior and should, therefore, be carefully considered.” (Brink & Rankin, 2013) 
Statement 5C 
There are large regional differences in PBC (O), as Chinese and European firms 
use PBC more rarely than North American firms (C), because of lack of 
experience with PBC systems (M) – especially when firms are state owned (O). 
Additionally, differences can be caused by significantly higher tax rate reducing 
the net reward (M), differences in power distance (M) and lower level of 
cultural preference for competitiveness, achievement, and material success (M). 
“As compared to the US firms, the Dutch firms are much less likely to provide their 
managers with incentive compensation in any form. Where Dutch firms do offer 
incentive compensation, the payouts are smaller and their bonus awards are less likely 
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to be based on profit measures of performance.” (Jansen, Merchant, & Van der Stede, 
2009) 
“[S]cores on the masculinity dimension of culture in the USA, the Netherlands and 
China were 62, 14 and 66, respectively. This suggests that both the USA and China 
are similar in their degree of masculinity, on average, whereas the Netherlands 
appears to be relatively ‘feminine’ as measured by this cultural trait. These differences 
in masculinity cultural dimension scores seem to reflect the differences we found in 
the use of incentive compensation in firms in these three countries” (Merchant, Van 
der Stede, Lin, & Yu, 2011) 
“[P]ower distance scores that were essentially equal in the USA and the Netherlands 
(40 and 38), but significantly higher in China (80). This pattern of scores reflects the 
relative use of discretion in the assignment of incentive payments that we found in 
these three countries. . . . Chinese managers’ relative lack of experience with incentive 
systems could explain some of the variance in practice we observed, such as the high 
use of discretion in assigning bonuses, which might also be associated with 
measurement systems that are not as well developed.” (Merchant, Van der Stede, Lin, 
& Yu, 2011) 
“However, the controlling shareholder (that is, the government) of state-controlled 
Chinese firms often has non shareholder value-maximizing objectives and thus may 
have little incentive to adopt a strong managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. . . 
. However, consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we find that the sensitivity of 
managerial cash compensation to firm performance and the level of long-term 
managerial incentives are significantly higher for state-controlled Red Chip shares 
than for state-controlled A shares and state-controlled H shares.” (Ke, Rui, & Yu, 
2012) 
6 EMPLOYEE RECRUITMENT 
Statement 6A 
PBC (C) can be used to choose and attract skilled employees (O) because people 
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who share the goals and risk tolerance are attracted by specific PBC attributes 
(M). 
“Implementation of the plan leads to the attraction and retention of more productive 
employees, supporting the hypothesis that a pay-for-performance plan acts as an 
effective screening device by sorting employees by ability.” (Banker, Potter, & 
Srinivasan, 2000) 
“[W]e find that relative-performance-based pay does attract participants with higher 
skill levels and that risk preferences play an important role in compensation plan 
selection.” (Brown, Farrington, & Sprinkle, 2016) 
“Our results support the expectation that the two control choices complement each 
other, so that the right people are hired and incentivized to achieve pre-specified 
goals. Output-based performance measures are less likely to result in misallocation of 
effort (i.e., to those tasks that are easily measured) when individuals are selected with 
values and beliefs that are similar to their manager and/or the firm as they will strive 
to achieve output-based goals in such a way that is congruent with the overall goals 
of the firm.” (Abernethy, Dekker, & Schulz, 2015) 
“Further, we demonstrate that risk and loss preferences affect preferences for 
contracts. These psychological constructs may be inherent characteristics of potential 
employees, which can be difficult to change. Rather, companies face the challenge of 
designing or describing contracts in a manner that makes them more attractive to the 
types of employees they wish to hire.” (Brink & Rankin, 2013) 
Statement 6B 
PBC (C) can have a positive effect in retaining employees (O), by lowering 
performance targets (M), or a negative effect (O) by utilizing penalty contracts 
(M) especially when employees are skilled and high-quality (C). 
“[W]hen firms are greatly concerned about managerial retention, they set 
performance targets to be relatively easy to achieve.” (Matějka & Ray, 2017) 
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“[W]e find penalties (bonuses) to be associated with a higher(lower) probability of 
voluntary employee turnover, where the effect of penalties on employee turnover is 
especially significant for skillful and high-quality workers.” (Van der Stede, Wu, & 
Wu, 2020) 
7 CONTRACT FRAMING AND RISK 
Statement 7A 
Bonus contract, compared to penalty contract (C) is more effective (O) when 
targets are defined ex-post (C). When contracts are incomplete (C) bonus 
instead of a penalty (C) or giving the employee a choice between the two (C), 
indicates trust to the employee (M), and, on the opposite, using a penalty 
accelerates employee turnover (M). Employees also perceive a bonus better than 
a penalty (M). In the case where employees can affect the manager’s penalty 
(C), there is also the possibility of retaliation against the manager (M).  
“An employer would have to offer a higher set of payoffs to get employees to accept 
an incentive contract if it is described as a penalty than if it is described as a bonus; 
and if employers do not gain some greater benefit by using penalty language, there is 
no reason for them to offer the penalty contracts and incur the extra expense.” (Luft, 
1994) 
“Therefore, the marginal sensitivity of bonuses eventually becomes greater than that 
of penalties when their value is large, suggesting that a penalty scheme does not 
always dominate a bonus scheme across the board in motivating employees.” (Van 
der Stede et al., 2020) 
“The results indicate that participants prefer bonus-only contracts to economically 
equivalent penalty-only, bonus and penalty combination, or clawback contracts. We 
find that penalty-only contracts are viewed as just as acceptable as economically 
equivalent contracts that contain a combination of bonuses and penalties. Further, we 
find that contracts framed with a clawback penalty are significantly less attractive 
than even economically equivalent penalty-only contracts. These results are important 
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because they provide evidence that there may be unintended consequences associated 
with the increased implementation of penalties and clawbacks.” (Brink & Rankin, 
2013) 
“[I]ndividuals meet the predetermined performance target more frequently when the 
target is revealed ex post (88%) than when it is revealed ex ante (47%) under a bonus 
contract. In contrast, individuals meet the performance target 56% of the time when 
the performance target is prescribed ex ante and when the target is revealed ex post 
under a penalty contract.” (Liu & Zhang, 2015) 
“[F]or a task not governed by the incentive contract, agents exert greater effort under 
bonus contracts relative to penalty contracts. . . . the relation between contract frame 
and effort depends on the level of trust induced by the implementation of a bonus or 
penalty contract.” (Christ, Sedatole, & Towry, 2012) 
“Implementing a penalty contract can amplify its benefits when the manager has a 
high quality relationship with his/her subordinates. However, that same penalty can 
create active resistance among employees with a low quality relationship with their 
manager.” (Christ & Vance, 2018) 
“[W]e find penalties (bonuses) to be associated with a higher(lower) probability of 
voluntary employee turnover, where the effect of penalties on employee turnover is 
especially significant for skillful and high-quality workers.” (Van der Stede, Wu, & 
Wu, 2020) 
“Our results suggest that employers may be able to induce higher worker effort 
without causing workers to withhold effort on other tasks, or retaliate in other ways, 
by offering workers a choice of contracts and making the workers aware that the 
employer intentionally decided to offer the available contracts.” (Gonzalez, Hoffman, 
& Moser, 2020) 
Statement 7B 
Using a penalty contract instead of a bonus contract is more powerful at 
exerting effort from employees (O) if employees perceive the compensation and 
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organization as fair (C), because employees’ tendency for loss aversion (M), but 
it also increases risk-taking (O). 
“Relative to a bonus contract, a penalty contract imposed on the manager induces 
greater effort from subordinate employees who perceive a high-quality relationship 
with the manager.” (Christ & Vance, 2018) 
“If in contrast, payment is fair, then a shift from a bonus to a penalty contract 
significantly increases risk-taking and effort.” (Oblak, Ličen, & Slapničar, 2018) 
“We find that an RMB1 penalty motivates a higher level of effort and performance 
than an RMB1 bonus. This is consistent with the theoretical argument that penalties 
have a stronger effect than bonuses due to humans’ loss aversion tendency.” (Van der 
Stede, Wu, & Wu, 2020) 
Statement 7C 
Employee risk-taking can be avoided (O) by careful feedback of poor 
performance (C) because employees tend to compensate for poor performance 
by taking risk (M), by utilizing clawback provisions in high-risk investments (C) 
because managers are more liable for results (M), and by utilizing bonus instead 
of penalty contracts (C), especially in decisions that only affect loss size (M).  
“[T]he deteriorating performance is not due to reduced effort but rather to reduced 
effectiveness of the participants’ task strategy as they devote cognitive resources to 
activities unrelated to the tasks and/or adopt more high-risk strategies.” (Hannan, 
Krishnan, & Newman, 2008) 
“We find that clawback provisions in a loss position, where the outcome of an 
investment decision changes only the size of a loss, lead to additional risk-taking, 
whereas clawback provisions reduce risk-taking in a mixed-outcome position, where 
the outcome of an investment leads to either a gain or a loss.” (Hirsch, Reichert, & 
Sohn, 2017) 
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“In the fair/bonus condition the frequency of high risk-effort decisions is radically 
lower than in the fair/penalty condition.” (Oblak, Ličen, & Slapničar, 2018) 
“In a mixed position, participants refrain from choosing riskier investments that could 
have a negative impact on their individual compensation.” (Hirsch, Reichert, & Sohn, 
2017) 
“In fact, our results are consistent with participants exhibiting an endowment effect. 
Whereas loss aversion states that people are more motivated to avoid a future loss 
than acquire a similar future gain, the endowment effect states that current ownership 
increases utility. Therefore, the utility of receiving a bonus is less than the disutility of 
losing a previously awarded bonus. Hence, the endowment effect may have 
overwhelmed loss aversion under clawback contracts.” (Brink & Rankin, 2013) 
8 GOALS AND TARGETS 
Statement 8A 
Long-term performance can be increased (O) with greater reliance on long-run 
targets (C) because of increased long-term goal congruence (M), with deferral of 
bonus payments (C) or the use of stock as a bonus payment (C) because of the 
non-instant reward that rewards long-term focus (M).  
“[G]reater reliance on long-run criteria as well as greater reliance on subjective 
(nonformula) approaches for determining the SBU general managers' bonus 
contributes to effectiveness in the case of build SBUs but hampers it in the case of 
harvest SBUs…” (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985) 
“This study provides evidence that contracting on forward-looking performance 
measures provides benefits to firms regardless of employees' employment horizons, 
but that the nature of the benefits differs across horizons. For short-horizon employees, 
forward-looking measures play a decision-influencing role, in that incorporating these 
measures into incentive contracts aligns such employees' goals with those of the firm 
and directs employees' efforts to actions that will increase long-term firm 
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performance. Thus, for short-horizon employees, contracting on forward-looking 
measures mitigates the shortsightedness that occurs when compensation is based 
solely on contemporaneous measures. . . . Compensating employees on the basis of 
forward-looking measures simplifies long-horizon employees* multiperiod decision 
problem by increasing the clarity with which employees identify the performance-
maximizing task strategy, thus decreasing the need for employees to experiment with 
various task strategies and increasing their farsighted efforts. Because resources can 
be redirected from strategy selection to its implementation and refinement, these 
employees are more efficient in task execution. Thus, while accounting researchers 
generally accept that incentive contracts play a decision influencing role in firms, our 
results demonstrate that they can also play a decision facilitating role, improving the 
performance even of those employees whose goals are more closely aligned with the 
firm's long-term interests.” (Farrell, Kadous, & Towry, 2008) 
“[A] deferral of economically equivalent bonus payments encourages managers to 
place greater importance on their responsibility for the firm’s long-term interests and 
their reputation. Hence, managers with a bonus deferral scheme are more willing to 
make an investment that decreases their current bonus but that is necessary for the 
firm’s future success.” (Cheng, Dinh, Schultze, & Assel, 2019)  
“[W]hen ESOs and other long-term incentives are absent, investors value employees' 
annual stock bonus positively, especially when the firm's future investment 
opportunities are greater, even though the annual stock bonus is tied to the firm's 
contemporaneous performance. . . . expected future stock compensation may be an 
important factor when one analyzes the incentive effect of current compensation if 
employees expect to receive stock compensation in the future conditional on the firm's 
future performance.” (Chen, 2003) 
Statement 8B 
High profitability firms (C) do not adjust targets upwards when they are 
achieved (O) but adjust targets downwards when they are not achieved (O), to 
signal a commitment to long-term and alleviate incentive conflicts (M), while 
low-profitability firms engage in target ratcheting (C) that decreases 
performance (O) due to mixed motivation from penalizing good performance 
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(M). Gaming and target ratcheting can be avoided (O) by utilizing peer 
performance comparison (C) because of increased accountability (M). 
Especially when peer-group is high quality (C), and if peer performance targets 
can be defined ex-post instead of ex-ante (C) because higher targets can be set 
initially, and then adjusted (M). 
“[W]e find that performance relative to target is highly serially correlated and that 
this serial correlation is attenuated when managers are close to achieving their annual 
target and therefore have incentives to reduce effort and avoid an overly favorable 
deviation from target. . . . incorporating peer performance into targets strengthens 
incentives because it essentially provides commitment that future targets will not fully 
update for past own performance. . . . high peer group quality is associated not only 
with lower (greater) sensitivity of targets to past own (peer) performance but also with 
less end-of-the-year performance gaming.” (Casas-Arce, Holzhacker, Mahlendorf, & 
Matějka, 2018) 
“In contrast, when the participants were asked to choose a performance target before 
embarking on their task, the addition of this absolute reference point indeed resulted 
in lower levels of sabotage, which we attributed to a shift in competitive focus from 
rivalry to the task.” (Hartmann & Schreck, 2018) 
“[W]e find that past performance is generally only partially incorporated in future 
targets, consistent with some form of commitment. We reason that some principals and 
agents are able to come to an implicit agreement in which the principal allows the 
agent to receive economic rents from positive performance-target deviations that are 
the result of superior effort or transitory gains by not revising targets upward, while 
the agent accepts target revisions by not restricting output when these revisions are 
the result of structural changes in the operation’s true economic capacity.” (Bol & 
Lill, 2015) 
“[W]e find that high-profitability firms commonly decrease earnings targets if their 
managers fail to meet their prior-year targets but rarely increase earnings targets 
even if their managers exceed prior-year targets. . . . low-profitability firms commonly 
revise targets upward if their managers exceed their prior-year targets but rarely 
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revise targets downward otherwise.” (Indjejikian, Matějka, Merchant, & Van der 
Stede, 2014) 
“However, subjective bonuses for year t are not used to motivate employees in advance 
to accept more-difficult targets for year t + 1. The picture that emerges identifies 
discretion in bonus decisions as being used to honor an implicit contract by rewarding 
employees’ efforts (a backward-looking role) and building reputational capital to 
enhance future employees’ commitment (a forward-looking motivational role).” 
(Aranda, Arellano, & Davila, 2019) 
“Our results indicate that more difficult targets are rewarded with higher subjective 
bonuses at the end of the period. This mechanism takes into account the motivational 
consequences of contracting and provides an alternative to attenuated ratcheting. 
Thus, discretion appears to play a backward-looking role in enhancing the perceived 
fairness of budget-based contracts. Discretion also appears to generate commitment 
going forward, as those branches that receive a higher subjective bonus improve their 
performance to a greater extent.” (Aranda, Arellano, & Davila, 2019) 
“Far from innocuous, performance standards generate important incentives whenever 
the participants in the incentive plan can influence the performance-standard or the 
standard-setting process. Key examples include paying managers for performance 
measured relative to budget when the managers are instrumental participants in the 
budget-setting process, or paying employees on performance relative to prior-year 
performance, when participants understand that good current performance will be 
penalized through a high future standard. . . . there is anecdotal evidence that 
ratcheted standards based on prior-year performance are not value-neutral, but rather 
have unintended and dysfuncational consequences for organizations.” (Murphy, 
2000) 
“[I]ndividuals meet the predetermined performance target more frequently when the 
target is revealed ex post (88%) than when it is revealed ex ante (47%) under a bonus 
contract. In contrast, individuals meet the performance target 56% of the time when 
the performance target is prescribed ex ante and when the target is revealed ex post 
under a penalty contract. . . . our experiment shows that an ex post bonus contract not 
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only significantly out-performs an ex ante bonus contract, but also motivates the 
highest performance among all four contracts examined in this research (ex post 
bonus, ex post penalty, ex ante bonus, and ex ante penalty).” (Liu & Zhang, 2015) 
“Our last hypothesis thus predicts that subjective ratings are used to provide an 
additional ex post mechanism to compensate subordinates for the varied exposure to 
compensation risk arising from performance targets that are deemed ex post to be 
inappropriate based on the realization of outcomes influenced by unforeseen and 
uncontrollable events that occurred during the period. . . . Specifically, we predict and 
find that supervisors give uniformly higher subjective ratings to managers who are 
exposed to greater compensation risk arising (i) from noise in objective performance 
measures, and (ii) from variation in the difficulty of targets set for objective 
performance measures (as measured both ex ante and ex post of the performance 
evaluation period).” (Anderson, Dekker, Sedatole, & Wiersma, 2020) 
“Interactive discussion of strategic problem areas increase the visibility of actions, 
and strengthen accountability to peers – even more than in diagnostic control. In 
respect of the latter, it is more likely that external factors smooth the results so that 
prevailing problems are ignored and/or poor actions are not perceived by others. As 
a consequence, it is likely that resistance against interactive control systems, grounded 
in detailed non-financial information, is higher than towards diagnostic control 
systems for some individuals.” (Tuomela, 2005) 
Statement 8C 
Difficult targets increase performance (O) in a team setting (C) by creating 
norms within the teams that promote supporting and higher performance (M). 
Target difficulty and PBC are complements when difficulty is high (M), so 
increasing PBC while increasing difficulty (C) mitigates performance reduction 
due to increased difficulty (O). 
“Group-based incentives elicited group performance expectations with stronger 
normative power than did individual-based incentives. The results also suggest that 
the nature of the group approval curve was altered by the type of incentive scheme and 
that groups tended to be more supportive under difficult budgets than they did under 
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moderate budgets. Contrary to our prediction, difficult budgets tended to elicit 
stronger normative power than did moderate budgets.” (Abul-Ezz, 1993) 
“[T]arget difficulty and relative incentive weights are complements—increasing the 
difficulty of a target that is already difficult to achieve has an effort-reducing effect, 
which can be offset by increasing relative incentive weight on that dimension.” 
(Matějka & Ray, 2017) 
Statement 8D 
Achievement of targets increases performance (O) because it enhances 
distributive fairness perception of employees (M) and because in a tournament 
setting (C) the increased number of winners reduces stagnation of performance 
of the top and bottom performers (M). If the number of employees who get the 
rewards in a tournament setting is low (C) it decreases performance (O) because 
of risk of sabotage (M) and low performers giving up early (M). 
“[W]e find that the achievement of bonus targets positively affects perceptions of 
distributive, but not procedural fairness. . . . The implication of our study is that when 
determining bonus payouts, supervisors who care about the fairness perceptions of 
their employees should be less concerned about absolute bonus levels than about how 
actuals compare to ex ante defined bonus targets.” (Voußem, Kramer, & Schäffer, 
2016) 
“We find that a higher proportion of winners leads to more effort. . . . Specifically, we 
find that when employees compete in repeated tournaments, their effort varies 
depending on the proportion of winners. While the loser majority in tournaments with 
a relatively low winner proportion reduces effort sharply, the winner majority in 
tournaments with a relatively high winner proportion reduces effort only slightly. . . . 
While the loser majority in tournaments with a relatively low winner proportion 
reduces effort sharply, the winner majority in tournaments with a relatively high 
winner proportion reduces effort only slightly.” (Knauer, Sommer, & Wöhrmann, 
2017) 
142 
“When detailed ABC cost knowledge was combined with a tournament incentive, 
workers engaged in innovations benefiting only themselves, and the production costs 
were higher and profits lower than in any other examined combination.” (Drake, 
Haka, & Ravenscroft, 1999) 
“As predicted, in the absence of an absolute standard, rankings increased 
performance levels but also led more participants to sabotage their peers’ work.” 
(Hartmann & Schreck, 2018) 
9 IMPLEMENTATION  
Statement 9A 
Implementation of PBC is a critical part and can succeed in increasing firm 
performance (O) by implementing during a time of good performance (C), 
because managers become more accepting of the system when it gives them 
more income (M). If management is motivated the implementation also 
facilitates collective learning and discussion about organizational goals and 
strategy (M), which also encourages other intra-organizations to adopt the PBC 
(O). 
“[I]mplementation issues may be far more important to the success or failure of a 
balanced scorecard systems than the scorecard’s technical attributes” (Ittner, 
Larcker, & Meyer, 2003) 
“The high level of subjectivity in the balanced scorecard plan led many branch 
managers to complain about favoritism in bonus awards and uncertainty in the criteria 
being used to determine rewards. The system ultimately was abandoned in favor of a 
formulaic bonus plan based solely on revenues.” (Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003) 
“[T]he programme was implemented at the beginning of a sustained period of good 
performance. They believe that rewards provided early in the programme’s history 
facilitated the managers’ acceptance of the program.” (Merchant & Riccaboni, 1990) 
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“In these meetings all top managers were involved in thorough discussions about 
strategic metrics, assumed cause-and-effect relationships and strategic uncertainties 
underlying these. . . . The focus of the new strategic performance measurement system 
gradually (and somewhat unintentionally) shifted towards making sense of strategic 
uncertainties and trying to capture cause-and-effect relationships assumed to be 
inherent within the strategy. Altogether, the goal of the new performance measurement 
system evolved during the construction process from the support of beliefs systems 
(customer focus) via establishing a diagnostic control system to interactive control 
system in order to learn about strategy and related factors. . . . In addition, the focus 
was on discussion and learning –interactive use – and there was no interest in creating 
a reward or punishment atmosphere. Finally, it was perceived that reward systems 
should not be tightly linked to the bonus systems when ambiguity about measures and 
appropriate target levels prevails. But, as suggested above, such a connection might 
be less important if the managers have themselves developed the system for their own 
learning purposes.”(Tuomela, 2005) 
“Firms use the performance measurement system to translate and communicate 
strategy throughout the firm. Thus, the firm’s performance measurement system 
facilitates transparency within the organization. Finding that labor-intensive firms 
rely more on the use of non-financial measures, and specifically human resource 
measures in incentive schemes is consistent with this notion. By clearly including non-
financial measures in the incentive schemes the importance of human capital is 
communicated throughout the firm.” (Widener, 2006) 
“First, we show that uncertainty about the benefits and costs of performance-based 
incentive systems plays an important role in the timing of the adoption decision. The 
mechanisms by which this uncertainty is reduced or even resolved are, therefore, of 
particular importance to designers of an innovation. In our setting, learning spillovers 
lead to a reduction in the uncertainty about benefits and costs, . . . Through its 
organizational structure, a firm influences the degree to which employee or 
organizational units interact with each other. In our setting, the cooperative nature 
and the continuing interactions between local banks facilitated learning spillovers. 
Moreover, by taking an active role in information sharing (e.g., by having regional 
directors), and by adjusting the innovation to local banks’ preferences (e.g., changing 
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the recommended weights), the organization ensured that early adopters efficiently 
shared their learning experiences. Hence, the cooperative’s organizational design 
facilitated relatively rapid diffusion of the performance-based incentive system, by 
encouraging and allowing learning spillovers to take place.” (Bol & Moers, 2010) 
Statement 9B 
PBC is an evolving process in an organization (C), so benefits are only realized 
after some time (O). 
“[P]articipants receiving the incentive-based contract also performed better on the 
tasks than participants receiving the flat-wage contract. However, the incentive-based 
contract induced better performance only after the first 15 of the 60 experimental 
periods.” (Sprinkle, 2000) 
“Our results are similar in spirit and show that incentive contract design is a dynamic 
process in which learning is of crucial importance.” (Bol & Moers, 2010) 
10 FEEDBACK, RECOGNITION AND PROMOTION INCENTIVES 
Statement 10A 
Providing feedback to the employee (C) has mixed results (O). Relative 
performance feedback increases the performance (O) when the employee is 
compensated based on individual performance (C) but decreases the 
performance (O) if the employee performs worse than their peers (C). Some 
employees have no performance-affecting reaction to feedback at all despite the 
content (O). The situational differences arise because some employees 
appreciate the feedback as a valuable resource (M) and poor performers 
compensate poor feedback by doing unrelated tasks or taking more risks (M). 
“We find that providing relative performance feedback increases the performance of 
participants who are compensated based on an individual incentive scheme. . . . the 
specific content of the feedback has no impact on performance: participants increase 
the performance to the same extent when receiving coarse or fine feedback, and this 
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increase in performance is not affected by whether the feedback indicates that relative 
performance lags or excels.” (Hannan, Krishnan, & Newman, 2008) 
“Although performance increases for those participants whose feedback indicates 
their performance excels, this increase is not sufficient to overcome the deterioration 
in performance of the other participants, resulting in a net decrease overall. 
Interestingly, supplemental analysis suggests that the deteriorating performance is not 
due to reduced effort but rather to reduced effectiveness of the participants’ task 
strategy as they devote cognitive resources to activities unrelated to the tasks and/or 
adopt more high-risk strategies.” (Hannan, Krishnan, & Newman, 2008) 
“My results suggest that individuals receiving an incentive-based contract are likely 
to perform better than individuals receiving a flat-wage contract if: (1) the form of the 
incentive contract motivates profit maximization, and (2) the feedback provided for 
belief-revision purposes helps individuals make better decisions.” (Sprinkle, 2000) 
“I find that feedback has a positive performance effect only for those who state a high 
preference for it. This is consistent with feedback-seeking behavior literature, which 
suggests that feedback-seekers, i.e., those who actively search for more feedback, 
place a higher value on feedback as a resource and are more committed to meet 
performance goals.”(Lourenço, 2020) 
Statement 10B 
Recognition (C) because of an innate human desire for distinction (M), and, in 
the case of an employee who is more motivated by career progression than 
monetary rewards (C) implicit incentive to get promoted (M), leads to increase 
in performance (O). 
“Finally, being in the recognition condition (i.e., being ebligle to win an 
acknowledgement award) leads to an increase in performance regardless of the initial 
stated preference. This result signals the innate human desire for distinction.” 
(Lourenço, 2020) 
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“[I]ncentives provided by the company’s bonus plan are stronger for managers who 
are positioned at higher hierarchical levels, who face weaker implicit incentives from 
getting promoted to the next level, and who face weaker implicit incentives from 
getting promoted to the top of the organization, after controlling for the position’s 
scope and level of accountability.” (Ederhof, 2011) 
